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Section 1 
HISTORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH KOREA 
In the past two decades, Korea has experienced remarkable economic growth. 
Today, Korea is one of the outstanding newly industrialized countries (NICs). However, it 
was largely a war-ravaged, barren country from 1950 until the.early 1960s. 
How was it possible that this little country, whose land area is less than one-fourth 
of California, came to be better represented in world trade than China or India? What was 
the growth process and the development strategy? This chapter addresses those questions. 
1.1 1945 to 1961 
Before the end of the nineteenth century, when Western culture made its debut on 
the peninsula, some Western merchants described Korea as "morning calm" or "hermit." 
Oriental philosophy and culture such as Buddhism and Confucianism prevailed. There 
was little industry except agriculture. The Korean people lived primarily on such agricul- 
tural products as rice, barley, and other crops. 
The Japanese occupation, lasting until the end of the second World War, prevented 
the westernization and industrialization of Korea and also discouraged Korean creativity 
for forty years. During this period, Japan made use of the peninsula by developing the 
south as the granary and building the heavy-chemical industry in the north. 
The partition in 1945 made South Korea a crippled and malformed country. There 
were few machine factories, chemicals, or mines in the South. In the North were the iron 
ore and 90% of the country's other minerals. About 92% of all electric power capacity was 
in the North. The North also held the human results of the industrial tradition from the 
1930s and 1940s: skilled workers and technicians and engineers. 
While the people in the South enjoyed new-found freedoms, those in Pyong-yang 
copied the Soviet state planning mechanism, with one party ruling supreme without any 
debate. Then the Korean War left the South prostrate on a war-flattened, barren land. 
Through the 1950s, South Korea's political leadership was unable to provide social 
stability and economic policy direction. Under these conditions, it was not possible to mobi- 
lize the creative energy of the people. During this decade Korea depended on grants-in-aid 
and concessionary public loans, mainly from the United States, which financed the impor- 
tation of necessities for the overpopulated country. 
As late as the early 1960s, economic conditions in South Korea were similar to 
those of any of today's resource-poor, low-income, developing countries. The nation, al- 
ready overpopulated, was experiencing an annual population growth of nearly 3%,, and 
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there was widespread unemployment. Per capita GNP in 1961 was a meager $82, and 
the level of domestic savings almost negligible. The country had no significant exports and 
ran chronic balance of payments deficits. In 1961 its total exports amounted to $43 mil- 
lion, or less than a quarter of its imports. The country did not yet have such developments 
as a skilled labor force, foreign technology, canny bureaucracy, and foreign credits, which 
are now mentioned as South Korea's growth factors. 
Until Park Chung-Hee came to power in 1961 and the first Korean five-year plan 
began in 1962, reconstruction in the North was ahead of that in the South. 
1.2 1962 to 1978 
The Park government, established in the spring of 1961, adopted strategic economic 
development as a '  primary political goal, rather than national unification or liberal 
democracy, to which preceding governments had given priorities. In 1962, the government 
launched the first of a series of five-year economic plans, through which development 
strategy has been practically executed up to the present. 
Initially, the emphasis of the first five-year plan (1962-1966) was on the import of 
necessities, and formation of fundamental overhead capital. However, the inward-looking 
development strategy based on import substitution could not remain the best policy be- 
cause of South Korea's poor natural resource endowment and small domestic market. 
Therefore, about 1964, the government instituted a series of measures to promote labor- 
intensive manufacturing exports in which Korea had comparative advantages. 
As early as 1963, the government introduced a full-scale export-import link system, 
under which the volume of non-aid imports was limited to the amount of export earnings, 
in order to promote exports while controlling imports. The government readjusted the ex- 
change rate in 1964, and the Korean Won (w) was devalued by nearly 100%. A multiple 
exchange rate system was replaced by a unified exchange rate system, and the official ex- 
change rate was devalued from 130 won to 256 won per dollar, thus eliminating a bias 
against the export sector. . 
In addition, a government export-targeting system was established to further 
strengthen the drive for export expansion. The Korea Trade Promotion Corporation 
(KOTRA) was also created in 1964 to support overseas market development. 
Other export incentives provided by the government included: 
1) Tariff exemptions on imports of raw materials for export production; 
2) A preferential export credit; 
3) Direct tax reduction on income earned from exports and other foreign exchange 
earning activities; 
4) Elimination of chronic budgetary deficits in order to minimize price distortions 
stemming from infiation; 
5 )  Elevation by commercial banks of interest rates on deposits from 12% to 26.4% 
in order to mobilize domestic savings; 
6) Enactment of a comprehensive act to promote infusion of foreign capital, 
whereby the government underwrites the risk borne by the foreign investors. 
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In regard to import policy, as a first step toward liberalizing imports, a shift was made 
from a "positive list" system of import controls to a "negative list" system. The govern- 
ment allowed importation of major grains in large quantities, abandoning the policy of 
grain self-sufficiency. 
<e 
%\ 
For a nation with a long tradition of looking inward, Korea's adoption of outward- 
looking policies was regarded by many foreign and Korean economists as politically and 
economically risky. Many conservative economists wondered whether the outward-looking 
development strategy would endanger national independence. They were concerned about 
possible negative consequences of relying on foreign capital, which in 1962 made up 83% 
of total investments. 
However, positive results of the export-oriented development strategy surpassed all 
expectations. The annual growth of exports in real terms between 1961-1971 was more 
than 36%. Annual growth real GNP, propelled by growth in exports, was 8.7% during the 
same period. This rapid economic growth was accompanied by a modest rise in prices 
compared to the subsequent period. The average wholesale price increase during the 
1962-1971 period was 12%. ) 
Despite the satisfying results of the outward-looking strategy in the 1960s, the 
Korean government began to modify its development strategy in the early 1970s. 
By 1972, when the third five-year economic plan was launched, several external 
shocks were disturbing Korea. First, in 1971 the Nixon Administration had reduced the 
U.S. troop level in South Korea by one-third, requiring Korea to step up its national 
defense efforts, including development of heavy industry. 
Second, in the same year, the Bretton Woods system began to disintegrate. This led 
Korea to avoid growing international protectionism by diversifying its trading partners and 
restructuring the composition of its commodity exports in favor of more sophisticated, high- 
value-added industrial goods. 
Third, the quadrupling of oil prices in 1972-1974 brought further pressure on the 
balance of payments. 
All of these changes caused the outward-looking strategy to be replaced partly by 
emphasizing import substitutions, especially in heavy and chemical industries and in 
agriculture. 
The Heavy and Chemical Industry Development Plan, announced in 1973, called for 
an accelerated schedule to develop technologically sophisticated industries to meet defense 
needs and upgrade the composition of exports. The government established the National 
Investment Fund, which mobilized public employee pension funds and a substantial portion 
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of private savings at commercial banks, in order to grant low-interest loans for heavy- 
industry projects favored by the government. Such low interest rates caused a chronic ex- 
cess demand for loans, which stimulated expansion of the domestic money supply. 
On the other hand, the government adopted a grain price support program to 
achieve the twin objectives of improving rural income and ensuring self-sufficiency in 
grains. In the initial phase, the program succeeded in increasing rice yield per acre and 
also in reducing the urban-rural income disparity. However, it failed to serve the long- 
term interest of the nation, because operation of the program produced a substantial 
budgetary deficit that increased inflationary pressures. 
Although the government shifted its emphasis to import substitution in heavy and 
chemical industry and in agriculture, it continued its efforts to promote exports. The most 
important policy thrusts in the 1970s in regard to exports involved diversifying trade 
regions and commodities. This contributed not only to the upgrading of exports in the 
1970s but to maintaining a high growth of exports during this period. Exports jumped 
from $1.6 billion in 1972 to $12.7 billion in 1978 in terms of current U.S. dollars. The an- 
nual growth of exports between 1972 and 1978 reached about 41%, higher than that of 
the subsequent period (36%). The share of commodity exports to the Middle East and 
Europe rose respectively from 1.8% and 11.8% to 11.7% and 17.5%, while the share to the 
U.S. and Japan dropped by 15% and 5%, respectively. The share of heavy and chemical 
industrial product in total exports rose from 21.3% to 34.7% during the same period 
(1972-1978). 
The policy shift during the 1970s produced mixed results. Annual growth of real 
GNP reached 10.8% between 1972 and 1978, which was higher than the growth during 
the subsequent period (8.7%). However, the substantial growth in GNP was accompanied 
by a high rate of inflation and some structural imbalances in the economy. 
Between 1972 and 1978 the annual rate of inflation measured in wholesale prices 
was nearly 18%, as opposed to 12% between 1962 and 1971. The high idat ion resulted 
from expansion of the money supply, budgetary deficits, wage increases, the jump in oil 
prices, and other factors. 
The most obvious structural imbalances in the late 1970s were as follows: 
1) Over-investment in heavy and chemical industries; 
2) Price and competition distortions owing to government controls; 
3) A rise in real wages that surpassed production improvements. 
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Even though economic development in the 1960s and 1970s was accompanied by 
some negative results, it was very important for the nation in various respects. The 
quality of life was substantially improved, and the Korean people became more self- 
confident and optimistic about the future. The balance of power in the Korean peninsula, 
which had largely favored North Korea, swung to South Korea. Although in 1962 the 
South began to grow more quickly than the North, not until 1969 was the North overtaken 
in GNP per capita. GNP per capita of the North and South was $200 and $208, respec- 
tively, in 1969, but during the next nine years the lead of the South increased by more 
than 100 The defense expenditures of the South, .at 6% of GNP, exceeded that of the 
North, which needed to spend about 20% of its GNP to match that sum. 
1.3 1979 to  1983 
The high inflation in the 1970s caused a rapid rise in the prices of daily necessities, 
on which' low-income groups spend relatively more than,others, and jeopardized growth of 
the economy by discouraging investment in productive assets. 
Therefore, in April 1979, the government announced a stabilization program. The 
goal was to restructure the entire economy so as  to enable the nation to make full use of 
its potential for continued high growth. 
Some major components of the program were: 
1) Setting lower targets for the growth rate of the money supply and also propos- 
ing a fundamental reform of the banking sector, in order to control excessive li- 
quidity; 
2) Suspending temporarily all new projects in the heavy and chemical industries 
and realigning credit priorities in favor of light industries, in order to deal with 
over-investment in the heavy and chemical industries; 
3) Decontrolling prices on many items and stepping up import liberalization ef- 
forts, in order to eliminate price distortions and promote competition. . 
Even though the price structure was largely normalized by the end of 1979, thanks to 
the stabilization program, the success of the policies was quite limited. There were two 
reasons for this. 
First, the oil crisis in 1979 doubled Korea's oil import bill and its balance of pay- 
ments position deteriorated. Moreover, the worldwide recession limited the growth of 
Korea's exports. 
Second, after the assassination of President Park on October 26, 1979, the nation 
began to experience many political difficulties, which reached crisis proportions in the 
spring of 1981. 
The Korean economy declined 5.2% in 1980 - the first instance of negative growth 
in more than 20 years. Social unrest and growing uncertainty greatly restricted total in- 
vestment, and many structural imbalances resulting from earlier policies burdened the 
economy. 
The new government inaugurated in September 1980 provided the strong leadership 
needed to stabilize the situation. It undertook wide-ranging institutional reform to restruc- 
ture the economy. The reforms have been designed to achieve three related goals: (1) 
price stability; (2) continued high growth; and (3) improvements in income distribution. 
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The strategy that the new government has chosen to achieve these objectives is to 
promote competition in all sectors of the economy and liberalize its external economic 
policies in every direction. 
In 1981 the economy of South Korea rebounded from the severe 1980 setback and 
returned to its high growth track, owing to the economic reforms and the recovery of the 
world economy. In 1981 South Korea's GNP grew by 6.2%, and the rate of inflation fell 
from 42% to 11%. 
In 1982, real growth reached 5.6%, with another sharp drop in inflation. During the 
year, wholesale prices rose only 2.4%. This lowered inflation rate was due largely to a 
decline in commodity prices abroad and various domestic stabilization measures. 
In 1983 the Korean economy grew 9.2% in real terms, and inflation continued to 
decline. Consumer prices increased only 2% and wholesale prices actually dropped by 
0.8%. 
Korea's exports in 1983 reached $23.1 billion, an increase of 10.5% in nominal 
terms, thanks to the world trade expansion and the increase in Korea's export competitive- 
ness resulting from price stability. 
Moreover, Korea's current account deficit decreased from $2.6 billion in 1982 to 
$1.6 billion in 1983, largely as  a result of the decline in oil prices and the export expan- 
sion. 
Korea, having attained both high growth and stability, projects annual real growth 
of 7.5% and an annual increase in prices (in terms of GNP deflators) of 1.8% during the 
period 19841986. 
To what should this great economic success of the past two decades be attributed? 
First, education has been one of the most important components of the national 
development. For centuries the Korean people have placed a high value on education. 
This heritage of respect for learning, combined with the desire for economic and social bet- 
terment, has made Korea one of the most literate countries in the developing world. 
Second, the government has been continuing its reform efforts to take full advantage 
of the potential of the Korean people. Most major decisions on Korean economic policy 
have been made by a s m d  circle of political and economic elite, including the President, 
the Korean CIA, the Economic Planning Board, and other economic ministers. The high 
government officials are normally supported by the government-sponsored institutions, 
such as the Korea Development Institute (KDI) and the Korea Institute for Economics and 
Technology (KIET). 
Third, this remarkable success would not have been possible without Korea's 
dynamic entrepreneurs, who had the energy and spirit to exploit new opportunities. 
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Finally, pressure from North Korea spurred the South Korean people into dynamic 
efforts to strengthen their nation by continuing to outdistance the Northern economy. 
Section 2 
THE KOREAN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT 
The development and characteristics of Korea's economy cannot be properly under- 
stood without reference to its environment. Environmental influences on the Korean 
economy can be discussed within four broad categories: (1) the political systems (inter- 
national relations, national security, political leadership, domestic political issues, etc.); (2) . 
social and cultural factors (cultural heritage, religion, language, customs and manners, 
etc.); (3) human resources (people, population, education, work ethic, unionization, etc.); 
and (4) natural resources (land and climate, mineral resources, energy, agriculture, 
forestry, fishery, etc.). 
Those environmental factors are briefly described here to provide a perspective on 
the advantages and handicaps of the Korean economy. This information is important for 
foreign companies interested in maintaining cooperative relations with Korean firms 
through trade, joint-ventures, and other activities. 
2.1 Political System 
International Relations 
Prior to 1882, during more than 4,000 years of isolation, Korea developed a unique 
culture and a distinctive way of life. After the country was opened to the Western World 
in 1882, it enjoyed free commercial and intellectual intercourse with other nations for a 
brief fifteen years. Conflicts with China, Japan, and Russia, and invasions by the forces of 
those countries, finally culminated in the formal annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910. 
At the end of World War 11, with the surrender of Japan on August 15, 1945, Korea 
seemed to have an opportunity for freedom and rebirth, but a wartime secret agreement 
divided the country into two zones above and below the 38th parallel. Soviet forces oc- 
cupied the north, and American forces the South. Korea still remains one of the world's 
potential flash points in the cold-war confrontation. 
After the Republic of Korea (South Korea) took over administrative powers from the 
American Military Government on August 15, 1948, the Korean people came to realize 
that a nation could not secure its prosperity without friendly relations with other nations. 
The government strengthened its ties with other nations, in particular the U.S., Japan, 
and other Western countries, which have played significant roles in South Korea's 
reconstruction and economic development during the past three decades. 
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In the early 1970s, the government declared that Korea would become more open to 
the East and reformulate its diplomatic policy to a multilateral system. This policy shift 
came from the Korean peoples' confidence in securing its independence, survival, and 
prosperity in the newly technologically united world. As a result, by 1978 South Korea 
had established diplomatic ties with 112 countries, including 54 that have official ties with 
North Korea. South Korea also strengthened its exchanges with other countries in such 
non-political areas as culture, sports, education, technology, and tourism. The 1988 Olym- 
pics in Seoul will be another opportunity for Korea to promote friendly relations with other 
nations. 
National Security 
. Many foreigners visiting Seoul on business pose an uneasy questions: "What if 
another Korean War breaks out?" The distance from Seoul to North Korea's artillery 
across the Korean demilitarized zone is only 45 kilometers, and the North's combat jets 
can reach Seoul in only 90 seconds. However, visitors are assured that military balance in 
the Korean peninsula is maintained by a mutual defense pact between Korea and the U.S. 
The Korean territorial division was just a part of the United States' global geopoliti- 
cal strategy for a post-World War I1 international order which ser;ed originally to disarm 
the Japanese armed forces in Korea. The line df demarcation, the 38th parallel, was in- 
tended to be only a temporary means of fixing responsibility between the United States 
and the Soviet Union, after the Japanese surrender. But this artificial and temporary line 
unfortunately brought about the partition of Korea, as a result of the cold-war confronta- 
tion after the World War. The Korean War, a result of the territorial division, threw the 
whole peninsula into utter confusion and resulted in preserving the demarcation line be- 
tween the North and South. 
Even though South Korea's economic growth after the Korean War surpassed that 
of the North, and its military expenditures between 1972 and 1979 were almost twice that 
of the North, the security of South Korea is still substantially dependent on the United 
States. Nearly 40,000 U.S. troops serve with more than 600,000 Koreans. Still, North 
Koreans under Kim 11-sung's 40-year rule have devoted much of their resources to building 
up a strong military power, while South Koreans have focused on their economic develop- 
ment; therefore, not achieving parity with North Korea in terms of military power. The 
issue of military balance in the Korean peninsula has, therefore, been a major topic in the 
U.S.-Korean Security Consultation meeting (SCM), which has a 15-year history. The 
balance between North Korea and the U.S.-Korean security pact has worked to maintain 
peace in the peninsula. 
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Political Leadership 
There have been five governments in South Korea since proclamation of the 
Republic of Korea in 1948. Rhee Sung-Man, the first president of Korea (the First 
Fzpublic) had spent his 40-year exile in the United States during the Japanese occupation, 
leading the Korean independence movement as a member of the Korean government-in- 
exile. National unification and liberal democracy were adopted by Rhee's government as 
national political goals, but the United States disagreed with the goal of unifying the 
country by using the military support of the U.S. 
. . 
When Rhee's 12-year dictatorship was smashed in the spring of 1960 as a result of 
the Students' Revolution, the new government (premier, John M. Chang) attempted to 
create a western-style liberal-democratic government like the one advocated in the Stu- 
dents' Revolution. However, the worsening economic picture and ineffectiveness of 
Chang's leadership prevented him from realizing the government's national goal, liberal 
democracy. 
Park Chung Hee, who directed the military coup on May 16, 1961, and became the 
third president of Korea in 1963, led the Third and Fourth Republics during his 16-year 
ruling period (1963-1979). Park's government adopted economic development as a pri- 
mary political goal. It launched a series of five-year economic plans, resulting in remark- 
able economic growth. Following the assassination of Park on October 26, 1979, the 
transformation of the Korean economy was stalled and political instability threatened 
economic progress. 
The new government (the Fifth Republic), led by President Chuil Doo Hwan, stabi- 
lized the political unrest and resumed the economic progress. The new government envi- 
sioned two primary national goals: economic advancement and political development. The 
Koreans have not experienced any peaceful shift of political power since the birth of the 
Republic of Korea. Therefore, the new constitution provides that a president elected for a 
seven-year term cannot be a presidential candidate for the next term. President Chan has 
succeeded in restructuring the Korean economy for continuous growth with stability, and 
has made significant progress on human rights. He has promised to become the first 
Korean president to step down voluntarily for political development. 
Domestic Political Issues , 
Some Western journalists note that South Korea does not yet meet U S .  require- 
ments for democracy. They remember that  President Carter proposed to withdraw U.S. 
troops from South Korea as a means of forcing Park to make progress on human rights. 
Human rights and political development remain important issues in South Korea. 
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Since 1981, the government has eased its political control considerably by removing 
bans on more than 300 politicians. However, many opposition leaders and young students 
insist that government should allow a freer press as well as freer political opposition and 
labor movement. The Koreans know well that only through democracy can they enjoy 
freedom and also continue the nation's prosperity. 
On the other hand, most Koreans think that U.S. requirements for democracy are 
not yet probable nor desirable for South Korea, given its political environment and tradi- 
tions. And the Koreans already enjoy a form of democracy and freedom incomparably 
greater than in North Korea, East Germany, China, the Soviet Union, or many other 
developing countries. 
Political liberalization must be supported by economic success. Improvements in the 
people's welfare and the quality of life vill enhance possibilities of political 1iberalizat.ion. 
Koreans now worry more about the possibility of economic crisis resulting from political 
unrest than about problems of human rights. 
2.2 Social and Cultural Factors 
Cultural Heritage 
Korea's long historical continuity as a nation has produced a unique social and cul- 
tural heritage. Situated at the center of a crossroad, it was only natural for Korea to in- 
fluence and be influenced by the cultural currents of surrounding countries. Korea's cul- 
ture was especially influenced by China. In turn, Korea sent cultural missions to Japan, 
thus acquainting the Japanese with Chinese culture. Only since the late 19th century has 
Korea been influenced by Western culture and that was accomplished largely through an 
intermediary, the Japanese. However, the Korean people have remained unified as a race 
with their own physical and cultural characteristics. Their traditions, customs, beliefs, 
language, and arts have followed a distinct pattern. 
Customs and Manners 
Though some traditions have been broken since the introduction of Christianity and 
other Western ideas, there are still traces of the old customs. 
Koreans, as a rule, have three names: the first. is the family name (surname); the 
second is the personal name; and the third is the generation name. The personal name 
(personal and generation name) is seldom used after childhood, except by a close friend. 
Elders are never called by their personal names, and neither are strangers. Some sur- 
names, such as Kim, Lee, and Park, are very common in Korea, just as are surnames 
Smith and Jones in the U.S. 
To understand human relationships in Korea, some attention must be devoted to the 
principles of Confucian thought. The determining factor in a Korean's life is his family. 
As head of the family the oldest men are greatly respected, and Koreans have great 
respect both for their ancestors and descendents. Many Western customs have been 
adopted, but there are still vestiges of the attitude that the female should be secluded, in 
spite of guaranteed equality under the law. 
Korean housing is also fast becoming westernized. Some people sleep on beds, but 
most use a thick mattress and blankets spread on the floor. 
One of the oldest customs concerns meals. Korean foods are cut into small pieces 
and served in various kinds of dishes, rice bowls, and soup bowls, for only spoons and 
chopsticks are used. Many foods are highly seasoned, and considerable time is required to 
prepare Korean foods. Aside from rice, the most popular dish is "Kimchi," a highly 
seasoned pickled combination of turnips, onion, celery, and other vegetables. 
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Religion 
Many faiths and cults are embedded in Korean culture. Koreans are a religious 
people with a deeply rooted conviction of the presence of spiritual beings. Until the intro- 
duction of Christianity in the 19th century, Korea's religion was likened to a three-legged 
stool based on Shamanism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. 
The general belief was in Shamanism, a form of animistic nature worship based on 
the veneration of spirits. This religion is still practiced by medicine men and women. Bud- 
dhism reached the peninsula from China and ran the gamut of popularity, sometimes be- 
coming the state religion. Though Confucianism is rarely practiced formally, Confucian 
ethics are deeply embedded in the Korean personality and culture as a philosophy and way 
of life. Many Confucian concepts still flourish. 
Christianity brought modern influences together with western culture. The success 
of the new doctrine may be attributed not only to the religious nature of the Koreans but to 
the fact that Christian ethics place great emphasis on love, justice, and personal freedom. 
Christian missionaries supplied the gifts of modern Western education and medical care to 
all people, irrespective of age or status. This furthered a better understanding of the West 
by imparting a knowledge of modern material science. There are approximately 10 mil- 
lion Christians in Korea, comprising a quarter of the total population. Missionaries and 
other Western Christians sometimes call Korea "the most Christian land in the Orient." 
Language 
The Korean language is one of the oldest languages in the world, for its origin can be 
traced to the beginning of Korea's history, more than four thousand years ago. The 
Chinese language has had great influence, owing to numerous Chinese migrations. 
Chinese characters were adopted as the literary language before the Korean phonetic al- 
phabet "Han-kul" was developed in 1448. Both Han-kul and Chinese characters are used 
in writing in Korea. 
In 1446, King Sejong directed a committee of Korean scholars to simplify and sys- 
tematize the native language. As a result, "Han-kul," a phonetic alphabet consisting of 
eleven vowels and fourteen consonants, came into being on October 9, 1448. Chinese 
characters were given Korean pronunciations, although .they retained their basic meaning. 
This new alphabet was much easier to learn than the Chinese characters, and was 
designed by King Sejong as a means to bring education to everyone. 
The Korean alphabet is considered one of the most perfect in the world. Each 
Korean syllable cluster consists of two or three symbols of the Korean alphabet. The syn- 
tax of Korean is similar to Japanese: (1) the sentence order is always subject, object, and 
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verb; (2) Nouns and verbs have neither number nor person; (3) Particles are used after 
substantives to indicate their function. The sound of the Korean language is characteristic 
of Altaic languages, which are mild and soft with little accent in pronunciation. 
Korean written language is simple enough to be mastered, but precise enough to in- 
dicate exact meanings. Therefore; it has been the tool that gives the Korean people access 
to mass education. Because a literate population is the foundation upon which democracy 
rests, the Korean language plays a significant role in both cultural and political develop- 
ment. 
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2.3 Human Resources 
The People 
The Koreans are the descendents of a Mongoloid race. In general appearance, they 
are distinctly Oriental, although distinguishable from their Chinese and Japanese neigh- 
bors. From earliest times Koreans have been noted for their polite manners. Their peace- 
loving nature is evidenced by the added connotations to such ordinary greetings as follows: 
Hello, "May you come in peace"; Good bye, "May you go in peace"; Good night, "May you 
sleep in peace." They have never launched aggressive action against their neighbors, and 
when attacked they have limited their military action to defense. 
They are friendly and individualistic unlike the Japanese who are a group people, 
like conformity, dislike anyone who behaves differently, and dislike anyone who deviates 
from the pattern. The Koreans are almost the opposite. Therefore, the Korean has been 
sometimes considered a bad group worker, or bad a t  cooperating with other people. 
However, industrial progress bears witness to the fact that the Koreans also allow them- 
selves to be coordinated, while a t  the same time continually making a bid for individuality. 
Population 
2 In spite of South Korea's small land area of less than 100,000km , its population is 
just over 40 million, or one-third of the Japanese population. The population density 
2 
reaches more than 400 p e r s o n s h  . Before the Korean War, North Korea had an es- 
timated population of 10 million, and the South an estimated 20 million. As of the middle 
of 1982, the South and North have populations of 39 and 18 million, respectively. During 
the first decade after the liberation from Japan, the population of South Korea increased at 
a rate of 5.58% per year, but since 1977 the rate has remained a t  less than 1.57% per 
year. 
While the economically active population of South Korea increased from 8.5 million 
in 1964 to 15.1 million in 1983, the unemployment rate dropped from 7.7% in 1964 to 
4.1%, with unemployed of 613,000 in 1983. The population was chiefly rural, but u- 
banization rapidly developed as a result of industrialization. In 1960, the populations of 
Seoul (capital and largest city) and Pusan (second largest city) were 2.5 million and 1.5 
million, respectively, comprising 9.8% and 4.7% of the total population. Now the popula- 
\ 
tions have reached 9.0 million and 3.5 million, accounting for percentage shares of 22.5% 
and 8.7%. On the other hand, until the 1950s, more than 70% of the population was 
employed in agriculture, especially in the cultivation of rice, which was the staple food. 
However, the number of persons engaged in that primary industry decreased from 4.8 mil- 
10 Section 2 
lion in 1964 to 4.3, million in 1983, or less than 30% of the total employment population. 
Employment in mining and manufacturing increased from 0.7 million to 3.4 million, while 
employment in service industries increased from 2.3 to 6.8 million. 
With respect to population by age, the number of persons less than 15 years old 
decreased from 12,684,000 (43.5% of total population) in 1960 to 12,656,000 (33.8%) in 
1980, in spite of a considerable increase in total population during the same period. 
During the same period, the number of persons 60 years old and more increased from 
1,512,000 (5.2%) to 2,267,000 (6.1%), and the middle age group between 15 - 59 years 
old) increased from 14,964,000 (51.3%) to 22,484,000 (60.1%). This structural change in 
the population means that South Korea's labor force is expected to grow at about 3% per 
year while population grows a t  1.5% per year during the coming ten years. 
Education 
Korea adopted a public system of education in the year 392. For many centuries 
the government had a cabinet minister of education. The reading and writing of Korean 
and Chinese instructions in Confucian ethics were taught in the public schools before the 
introduction of Western civilization. However, the opportunity of access to higher educa- 
tion, such as Confucian College (Sung Kyun Kwan) a t  Seoul and advanced public schools 
(Hyang Kyo) in every major district, was restricted within a limited high class (Yangban). 
Only graduates from that higher education available to the high class (Yangban) could 
take the government examinations (Kwaku) and become public servants. 
As American missionaries (Methodist and Presbyterian) funded many schools in 
Korea in the late nineteenth century, Western education was encouraged in Korea. During 
the Japanese occupation, education was severely limited and only a small percentage of 
Korean students were able to acquire a college education. Since the liberation in 1945, a 
great deal has been accomplished in modern education. As a result, the estimated adult 
literacy of 30% before liberation was already reaching 80% by the early 1960s, and today 
literacy is virtually universal in the age group below fifty. 
The schooling offered in Korea is organized as follows: The first through sixth year 
is primary school, with compulsory attendance; the seventh through ninth year is middle 
school; the tenth through twelfth year, high school; the thirteenth through sixteenth, col- 
lege and university. Even though the schooling system is almost the same as in Japan 
and the U.S., there are some differences in curricular values. 
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Japanese students are taught the value of filial piety, loyalty, nationalism, and feal- 
ty to the Emperor, besides their native language, foreign languages, music, art, science, 
etc. The Japanese education system does not encourage individuality. ,In contrast, unique 
values of education in Korea concern anti~communism and national security, while in- 
dependent spirit and individuality are emphasized. 
Japanese and Korean students begin studying the English language in the seventh 
grade, and other foreign languages (including Japanese in Korea) can be taken by high 
school students. Because English has become the most international of languages, instruc- 
tion of foreign languages in the United States is not emphasized as much as in Japan and 
Korea. 
With respect to higher education in Korea, the capacity of college and universities 
rose tenfold, from 20,050 students in 1963 to 202,592 students in 1983. This resulted 
from increased demand for higher education and demand for equalizing regional oppor- 
tunities for higher education. Thus, 35.8% of high school graduates go on to universities, 
which is above the level of most advanced countries. 
The Korean people's respect for learning has been combined with the desire for 
economic and social betterment. This is based on the traditional thought that success in 
academic life is the measure of an individual and reflects the honoring of mutual moral 
obligations. Surely, the rapid growth of the Korean economy can be attributed in large 
part to the people's enormous zeal and investment in their children's education. Education 
is likely to be one of the most important factors assuring the further development of 
Korea. 
Work Ethic 
A major attraction to foreign would-be investors in Korea is Korea's well-educated, 
skilled, but low-priced work force, which has contributed so much to the development of the 
Korean economy during the past two decades. Besides the abundant labor force and high 
level of education, the Korean people's work ethic is an important growth factor in South 
Korea. The industriousness and perseverance of the Korean people a t  all levels stems 
from the following factors: 
1) Korea's poor natural resource endowment and overpopulation have forced Koreans 
to work harder than workers in other countries, because without hard work they 
could not survive in such bad economic conditions. 
2) The Korean people have extraordinary zeal for wealth and freedom from poverty, 
because they have experienced severe poverty and grief resulting from political op- 
pression and war. 
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3) Hard work and a high respect for learning have been spurred by stiff competition for 
various kinds of opportunities, such as admission to schools, obtaining good jobs, 
promotions in any organization, good pay, etc. 
4) Most of the younger generation, who were born after the Second World War, have 
experienced three years' compulsory military service. That compulsory military 
service in general bas made them more patriotic and has enhanced their cooperative 
spirit. They are more willing to sacrifice their interest for the common good of their 
group or organization. 
Unionization 
Korean industry during Japanese occupation developed rapidly after 1931. By 
1938, Japanese enterprises in Korea were employing one million Korean workers. 
However, the living standard of Korean laborers was very low, while the Japanese enjoyed 
a privileged status, a shorter working day, and twice the wages paid to Korean workers. 
This differential labor condition caused most Korean workers to join an independence 
movement, although the Japanese suppressed trade unionism in Korea. 
After the liberation in 1945, trade unionism was volatile and confused like the politi- 
cal activity. Labor-management relations became aggravated by friction as prices con- 
tinued to rise and labor unions assumed a more definite form. The tension was accen- 
tuated as labor organizations became instrumental in the wide struggle for political power 
instead of contributing to the improvement of labor conditions. However, the new 
democratic constitution provided the right to work, the rights of unionization, collective 
bargaining, and collective action. The Labor Union Law, the Labor Mediation Law, and 
the Labor Conditions Law were established to provide equal wages for equal work, ir- 
respective of age or sex, an eight-hour working day, and other working conditions and 
measures for the welfare and security of the workers. 
After the military revolution in 1961, political activities of trade unions were 
prohibited, while the basic rights to labor and unionism were assured as  before. Since 
enactment of another labor law, the Act on Council of Labor-Management Cooperation, in 
December 1980, the council has entered a developing stage. At the end of 1982, labor- 
management coordination councils were established in all 4,756 firms with more than 100 
full-time employees. These councils contribute to preventing complicated problems in 
labor-management relations, and to increasing production efficiency and solving laborers' 
personal problems. In addition to a labor-management cooperation system that has eased 
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codlicts between the two bodies, the Ministry of Labor plans and executes other programs 
to foster a cooperative atmosphere and to improve the labor welfare system and industrial 
safety. 
(Th i s  page i n t e n t i o n a l l y  l e f t  b l ank . )  
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2.4 Natural Resources 
Land and Climate 
Located in Far Eastern Asia, Korea consists of a peninsula which projects 
southeastward from the continent of Asia and of about two hundred islands, the largest of 
which is Cheju. Korea is a transition area between the continental forms of Manchuria 
and North China and the island form of Japan. It has widely diverse landscapes and an 
unusual richness and variety of plant growth. Koreans call their homeland "Kumsu 
Kangsan," which means "beautiful landscape." More than 3,400 species and varieties and 
800 genera of vascular plants are indigenous to Korea. The profuse and colorful flora in- 
clude many wild and cultivated flowers. The rose of Sharon, which is the national flower 
of Korea, is called "Mukung Hwa" (Everlasting Flower). 
The country is mountainous. Less than 22% of the land is cultivated. Another 66% 
of it is mountains and forest, while the remaining 12% consists of roads, rivers, and hous- 
ing. Mountain ranges lie in the northern part and near the eastern coast. The south- 
western area is excellent farm land and is considered the granary of Korea. 
The climate of Korea is continental rather than oceanic. Cold and warm waves visit 
the peninsular in turn, causing extremes of cold and heat. Temperatures at  all seasons 
are somewhat lower than at corresponding latitudes in the United States. The coldest 
month of the year is January and the hottest months are July and August. The average 
0 
summer temperature is 75'~; average winter temperature is 33 F, occasionally dropping 
to zero. Short seasonal contrasts are characteristic, as shown by extremes a t  Seoul, where 
the maximum is over 1 0 0 ' ~  and the minimum is 10O~.  The annual rainfall is relatively 
light, amounting to about forty inches. There is little precipitation except during the rainy 
season, which comes in July and August. Sunlight is strong and abundant, Korea is for- 
tunate because is lies outside the track of typhoons and and earthquake zones. As a 
whole, the climate of Korea is unsurpassed in the Orient. Favored with beautiful natural 
scenery and a relatively mild climate, Korea is aptly called the "Switzerland of Asia." 
Mineral Resources 
The Korean peninsula abounds in mineral resources such as anthracite, iron ore, 
tungsten concentrate, silver, kaolin, limestone, lead ore, zinc ore, etc. However, the 
majority of the minerals are in North Korea, while South Korea suffers from a lack of all 
minerals. South Korea could not avoid importing minerals to meet increasing demands 
caused by rapid industrialization. Even though there has been sizable investment in the 
Korean mining industry for exploring new ores and developing refineries, the demand for 
general minerals is supplied largely by imports. In 1982, total demand for minerals was 
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supplied largely by imports. In 1982, total demand for minerals reached the value of 
1,077 billion won, of which 26% (280 billion won) was supplied by domestic products and 
the remaining 74% (797 billion won) was imported. To meet the increasing demand for 
minerals, Korea is currently participating in eight overseas resource development projects 
and five exploration projects. The Overseas Resources Developmerit Promotion Act was 
also amended to simplify the procedures and expand support for overseas resource 
development. 
Energy 
As Korea (North and South) produces no petroleum, this important energy source is 
supplied only by import. Even though there were many enormous dams in Korea before 
Liberation (1945), 92% of all the electric power capacity was in the North. Only in the 
coal sector could South Korea be compared to the North, although the North had twice as 
much coal as the South. Still, the South was able to secure near self-sufficiency of coal. 
Demand for energy in South Korea has increased sharply following successful im- 
plementation of four 5-year economic plans. Total energy consumption in 1961 reached 
9,747 thousand TOE (ton of oil equivalent). That figure rose to 49,699 thousand TOE in 
1983 a t  an average growth of 7.7% per year. In spite of no production of petroleum, 
petroleum consumption comprised 56.2% of total energy consumption in 1983, while coal, 
hydro, atomic, and firewood shared 33.2%, 1.4%, 4.5% and 4.8%, respectively. Crude oil 
imports amounted to U.S. $5,550 million in 1983, which accounted for almost a quarter of 
the total Korean imports. Power-generating capacity increased remarkably, from 597 MW 
in 1964 to 13,115 MW in 1983, a t  an average growth of 17.7% per year, It is divided into 
76.2% thermal power generation, 9.2% hydraulic and pumping generation, and 14.6% 
atomic generation. 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries 
Despite the limited area suitable to farming, the Korean people lived largely on 
agriculture before industrialization began in the 1960s. Forested mountain land occupies 
about 70% of the total area of Korea, and Korea is surrounded on three sides by seas. I t  
is situated a t  the edge of one of the four major fishing regions of the world, where sea bot- 
toms and tidal currents are especially suited to the propagation of marine life. Neverthe- 
less, the overpopulated country was not able ta improve the quality of life for people or 
develop its economy without industrialization in the sectors of manufacturing and mining. 
The primary engine for growth during the past two decades has been the export- 
oriented, non-agricultural sector, while growth of the agricultural sector has lagged far be- 
hind. As a result, the percentage share of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries in aggregate 
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GNP has declined from 46.5% in 1964 to 14.0% in 1983, while the proportion of farming 
population has also fallen from 55.6% to 23.7% during the same period. The self-sufficient 
ratio of major food grains dropped from 72.6% in 1978 to 53.0% in 1982, owing to import 
liberalization in the 1980s. The supply of such products as rice, wheat, cotton, and timber 
depends heavily on imports. In 1983, Korea's imports of grains reached the value of 
$1,175 million, which accounted for 47% for total demand. 
The agricultural sector, however, has played a very important role in Korea's in- 
dustrialization through provision of food supplies and low-cost labor. To improve agricul- 
tural productivity and alleviate food shortages and income differences between rural and 
urban households, the government has introduced such measures as price support policies, 
subsidy programs, Saemaul Undong (New Village Movement), farm mechanization plans, 
irrigation development, improvement of drainage system, etc. As a result, agri~ult~ural 
productivity and farm household incomes have risen remarkably, and new programs of so- 
cial and cultural development and industrialization in rural areas have already begun. 
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MAJOR CHARACTERISTICS OF THE KOREAN ECONOMY 
3.1 Economic Policy 
Basic Policy Directions 
As described in Section 1 (History of Economic Development in Korea), the new 
government undertook wide-ranging reforms to restructure the economy and achieve con- 
tinuous growth with stability. The strategy of promoting competition in all sectors of the 
economy and liberalizing its external economic policies in every direction was chosen to 
achieve such objectives as price stability, continued high growth, and improvement in the 
quality of life. 
To promote competition, the government changed its economic policy from strict 
government control of economic activity to encouraging economic efficiency through the 
free market mechanism and private initiative. When the economy was relatively small 
and simple, it was possible to allocate resources efficiently through a highly centralized 
decision-making process. However, as the Korean economy expanded rapidly, the exces- 
sive government controls began to produce price distortions and lack of competition. In 
Korea today, the allocation of resources through operation of the free market is not only 
desirable but essential. 
With respect to external liberalization, there have been policy reforms for liberaliza- 
tion of trade, technology transactions, and foreign investments. The import liberalization 
ratio rose from 75% in 1981 to 85% in 1984. The projected ratios for 1985 and 1986 are 
87.7% and 91.6%, respectively, At present, only 1,111 items out of 7,915 items of CCCN 
(Customs Cooperation Council Nomenclature) are subject to import-restrictive measures in 
Korea. Furthermore, existing non-tariff protection will gradually be replaced by tariff 
protection, and the average tariff rate will be substantially reduced, minimizing tariff dif- 
ferentials among individual commodities. The current policy on the inflow of foreign tech- 
nology is already very liberal; the government did away with prior approval of foreign in- 
vestment except in a limited number of industries in July, 1984, in order to meet foreign 
capital requirements. 
Role of Government 
Korean economic development efforts have been carried out through a series of five- 
year economic plans, initiated in 1962. Planning in Korea included not only policy forma- 
tion but policy implementation; the hand of government reached far down into activities of 
individual firms with manipulation of incentives and disincentives. 
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Just a s  Japan was accused in the 1960s and 1970s of being called "Japan, Inc.", 
since the 1970s Korea has also been referred to as "Korea, Inc." All major decisions on 
economic policy, according to the "Korea, Inc." system of government management, are 
made by a small circle of political and economic leaders. The formal mechanism for con- 
flict resolution is the Economic Ministers' Meeting, which is chaired by the Deputy Prime 
Minister and Minister of Economic Planning. Other members include six economic min- 
isters and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Meetings are currently held twice a week. 
Strategic decisions are later ratified when the entire cabinet meets. Even though South 
Korea is governed by a military-technocratic complex, it is civilian technocrats who hold 
the reins in the economic sector. 
Obviously, skillful strategists and career bureaucrats in the government are playing 
significant roles in economic policy formation. However, they are normally supported by 
relevant interest groups and specialists in the private sector. The Revised Fifth Five-year 
Plan (1984-1988) envisages a greater level of private-sector involvement in determining 
the overall direction of the economy, in the light of the new policy encouraging competition 
and the free market mechanism. The plant provides for establishing a private high-level 
forum for deliberating industrial development, which will monitor industry-related policies, 
including finance, taxes, and import liberalization. In general, the style of the new plan- 
ning is less demonstrative and exhortative, and more indicative, than previous plans. 
Monetary and Fiscal Policy 
Because the allocation of resources through the free market is efficient only if there 
are no extensive price distortions, the need for price stability is obvious. This price 
stability is also essential for improvements of income distribution, the balance of pay- 
ments, and the structure of debt. Korea's efforts to consolidate price stability are centered 
in conservative monetary policy and increased fiscal austerity. 
To make greater use of the market mechanism in the mobilization of savings and al- 
location of investment funds, the government has already taken a major step toward 
abolishing policy preference loans by doing away with the interest rate differential between 
these and other loans. To promote autonomous management of financial institutions, the 
Bank Law was amended, and the government has also relinquished its majority equity 
shares in five major commercial banks. The monetary supply system was changed from a 
direct control system regulating loan ceilings to an indirect control system utilizing adjust- 
ments in the total reserve fund for payment of financial institutions to promote 
autonomous fund management. In addition, the financial market was opened to improve 
efficiency through fair competition. After the establishment of non-bank financial institu- 
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tions was liberalized, many non-bank institutions have been established, and non-banks' 
share of the domestic financial market has risen from 30.5% in 1979 to 34.2% in 1983, 
while banks' share fell from 50.5% in 1979 to 32.9% in 1983. 
The government budget deficit has been a major factor responsible f ~ r  the excess 
money supply and inflationary pressure. Reducing the budget deficit is. essential for 
cementing price stability. During the past three years the government has reduced its 
budgetary deficit and borrowing from the central bank by freezing the level of total spend- 
ing. The government plans to achieve a balanced budget in 1985, and a budget surplus of 
U.S. $300 million in 1986. 
In 1983 the government made a modest adjustment to the progressive tax rate 
structure by reducing the maximum marginal corporate and personal income tax rates 
from 38% and 60% to 30% and 55%, respectively. According to the revised Fifth Economic 
Plan (1984 - 1988), the government will maintain the tax burden ratio of 22% of GNP, or 
more than the 1983 ratio of 19.4%, to reflect the natural tax increase caused by economic 
growth. It also plans to modify the tax system to put more emphasis on fair obligations. 
Trade Policy 
When the government launched its external economic policy of liberalizing imports, 
technology transactions, and fore ip  investment, it also made efforts simultaneously to im- 
prove the balance of payments as a means of reducing the nation's burden of foreign debt. 
Even though concern about the nation's foreign debt obligation has been voiced both at 
home and abroad, the diversification of the Korean economy makes the country less vul- 
nerable to a high debt level than some other high-debt countries. The debt servicing ratio 
is a t  a manageable level in Korea. Nevertheless, international financial markets have be- 
come less favorable for borrowers, and it is therefore necessary for Korea to improve the 
balance of payments by bringing the trade balance into surplus, controlling the level of 
foreign debts, and mobilizing domestic savings. 
The government is encouraging exports based on intra-industry specialization rather 
than inter-industry specialization. This will pose fewer difficulties for Korea's trading 
partners, and thus Korea should face less protectionist resistance. Because market diver- 
sification and product diversification through intra-industry specialization are considered to 
be the best way for Korea to increase its exports with less protectionist resistance, Korea 
will expand joint-investment activities and strengthen technical cooperation with countries 
that have major raw material supplies and high technology. 
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In the course of 20 years' rapid development, Korea's external debt increased rapid- 
ly. Recently the situation has been aggravated by worsening external conditions, including 
a sharp rise in crude oil prices and sustained high international interest rates. Korea had 
an outstanding external debt of U.S. $30.14 billion as of the end of 1983. In spite of the 
relatively large absolute volume of foreign debt, Korea's debt-service burden continued to 
improve thanks to improving current balances and steadily rising GNP, Moreover, 
Korea's access to relatively favorable conditions for foreign borrowing and its good inter- 
national reputation have been maintained despite the problems in the world financial 
market. 
Fundamental measures to reduce foreign financial debt are being promoted through 
a persistent increase in domestic savings and a continued improvement in the trade 
balance. The government makes efforts to improve the quality and variety of financial 
services to households. I t  also encourages corporations to improve their financial struc- 
tures and make productive savings for investment, while it is restraining public expendi- 
tures. 
Industrial Policy 
The basic direction of Korea's industrial policy during the 1980s is to prepare the 
economy for further exposure to internal and external competition, and expedite more 
balanced industrial growth. The industrial incentive system that has favored so-called 
"strategic industries" is being realigned, so that investment resources can be allocated 
more efficiently in accordance with the free market mechanism. More support is and will 
be given to investment in technological development and manpower training, and special 
emphasis is and will be given to promoting small- and medium-sized industries as a means 
of promoting industrial balance and easing the concentration of economic power. 
In April, 1981, the government implemented the Anti-Monopoly Act, the basic pur- 
pose of which is to eliminate cartel arrangements, price fixing, and other monopolistic prac- 
tices. For the purpose of early establishment of a fair transactions system, the act will be 
strictly enforced and also expanded to cover the banking, insurance, and real estate in- 
dustries. The import liberalization and reduced restrictions on direct foreign investment 
will impose vigorous foreign competition on domestic producers, and finally will contribute 
to enhancing the international competitiveness of Korean firms. 
To bring about the necessary transformation of Korean agriculture in line with in- 
dustrial development, the government has already acted to phase out the present high 
farm price-support programs for major grains. Instead, it has expanded credit facilities to 
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support agricultural mechanization. Further, in an attempt to augment farm household in- 
come with non-farm sources, the government is taking steps to disperse industrial ac- 
tivities inti medium-size rural towns. 
Social Welfare Policy 
Many foreign scholars and international organizations such as the International 
Bank for Reconstruction & Development (IBRD) have noted Korea's good record in income 
distribution. The most important factor for the favorable outcome in income distribution in 
Korea was the outward-looking growth strategy itself. The expansion of labor-intensive 
manufacturing exports increased employment opportunities, which directly benefitted those 
a t  the lower end of the income scale. 
kcently, the demand for improved social welfare is increasing with the nation's 
great strides in economic development. The basic direction of social development policies in 
Korea is to provide more jobs and to assure equal economic opportunities and upward so- 
cial mobility. Therefore, much more emphasis has been and will be placed on expanding 
employment opportunities and promoting education, rather than providing social welfare 
programs that have produced adverse effects in some advanced countries. While minimiz- 
ing the public financial burden, so that stabilization policies will not be threatened, the 
government will seek to meet basic needs for housing and health care, and also endeavor 
to encourage various insurance systems and reinforce other welfare services for the needy. 
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3.2 Structure of the  Korean Economy 
Industrial Structure 
With the export-oriented industrial policy shifts in the 1960s and heavily subsidized 
support of heavy and chemical industries in the 1970s, the changed industrial structure of 
Korea has produced very high economic growth over the past two decades. In 1983, 
Korea's GNP totaled $70.8 billion (58,280 billion won) and per capita GNP reached 
$1,875. The industrial structure of the Korean economy is illustrated in Tables 3-1 and 
3-2. 
All industries 716.3 100.0 1 58,279.7 100.0 
Table 3-1 
Sectoral Origin of GNP in Korea 
1964, 1983 
Agro-forestry 333.0 46.5 
fishery 
Mining- 123.3 17.2 
manufacturing 
Mining 12.2 1.7 
Light industry 77.4 10.8 
1964 
Amount Composition 
(billion won) % 
Heavy industry 33.7 4.7 
1983 
Amount Composition 
(billion won) % 
Source: Bank of Korea 
The GNl? share for the agro-forestry and fishery sector dropped from 46.5% in 
1964 to 14.0% in 1983. The shares for the mining and manufacturing sector in- 
creased from 17.2% to 29.5%. The share for the service sector increased from 36.3% 
Service 260.0 36.3 
to 56.5%. On the other hand, in 1983 the employment share for the agro-forestry- 
32,937.5 56.5 
fishery sector a t  29.7% still remained higher than that for mining-manufacturing at 
23.3%, in spite of the significant increase in mining-manufacturing's share and the 
sharp decrease of agro-forestry-fishery's share. 
Section 3 
Table 3-2 
Employment by Industries in Korea 
1964, 1983 
Number Composition 
(thousand) (%I 
Number Composition 
(thousand) 
All industries 7,799 100.0 
Agro-forestry- 4,825 61.9 
fishery 
Mining and 690 8.8 
manufacturing 
Service 2,284 29.3 
Source: Economic Planning Board 
During the past two decades, manufacturing production increased a t  a faster rate 
than GNP, and thus contributed more to GNP growth than any other sectors. (See Table 
3-3). The light industry sector recorded relatively high growth during the early decade 
(1963-1973) and showed low growth during the later. Typically, wood and wood products, 
including furniture, dropped from 40.7% of annual growth between 1963 and 1968 to an 
annual growth of 0.7% between 1978 and 1983. Conversely, the heavy and chemical in- 
dustry showed much higher growth during the later decades, especially in production of 
iron, steel, machinery, and transportation equipment between 1973 and 1978. This was 
largely the result of the Heavy and Chemical Industry Development Plan launched in 
1973. The performance and prospect of major industries in Korea will be covered in more 
detail in the following section. 
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Table 3-3 
Production Growth in Korea's Manufacturing Sectors 
1963-1983 
Average Annual Growth Rate (9%) 
GNP 
Manufacturing 
Food, Beverage 
and Tobacco 
Textile, Wearing 
Apparel & Leather 
Wood, Wood Products 
incl. Furniture 
Paper, Paper Products 
Printing, Publishing 
Chemicals, Petroleum 
Coal, Rubber and 
Plastic Products 
Non-metallic Mineral 
Products 
Basic Metal 
(Lron and Steel) 
Fabricated Metal 
Products 
(Machinery and 
Equipment) 
- - - - - - - - - 
Source: Economic Planning Board 
Structure of Foreign Trade 
There have been significant changes in both the quantity and substance of Korea's 
foreign trade during the last 20 years. As shown in Table 3-4, exports have increased 
from $86.8 million in 1963 to $24,445.1 million in 1983, a t  an annual growth of 32.6%. 
Imports also have steadily increased from $560.1 million to $26,192.2 million, a t  a slower 
growth rate of 21.2% per year, resulting in an increase in the trade deficit from $473.3 
million to $1,747.2 million. 
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Table 3-4 
Korean Exports and Imports 
1963 - 1983 
Volume Exports Imports (Trade Deficit) 
Annual Growth 
Rate 
Unit: U.S. Dollars in Millions 
Source: Office of Customs Administration. Based on customs clearance. 
Korea's outward-looking development strategy emphasizing labor-intensive 
manufacturing exports enable the nation to experience unusual economic growth and 
greatly increased exports. However, it also forced the nation to import substantial 
amounts of capital goods and raw materials, including energy sources. Accordingly, the 
trade deficit still remains and has been one of the most important factors in the increase of 
Korea's foreign debt. 
Korea's exports have become substantially diversified over the past two decades. In 
1963, Korea's exports were limited to agricultural products, raw materials, and some light 
industrial products. However, exports of heavy industrial and chemical products reached 
more than half of total exports in 1983. Even though the percent share of textile exports 
dropped from 47.3% in 1963 to 23.9% in 1983, textiles remain the largest Korean export. 
Exports of transportation equipment and electronic products increased remarkabiy, and 
the contribution of such new and promising sectors as  steel, machinery, electronic 
products, and transportation equipment will likely be more conspicuous in the future. (See 
Table 3-5). 
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Table 3-5 
Korea's Exports by Commodity 
1965, 1983 
- - - - - - - - -- 
Amount Composition (%) Amount Composition (%) 
Food and direct 29.0 16.6 1,223.2 5.0 
Consumer Goods 
Raw Materials 39.0 22.3 1,023.4 4.2 
and Fuel 
Light Industrial 86.6 49 5 9,654.6 39.5 
Products 
Textile 47.3 27.0 5,838.0 23.9 
Plywoods 18.0 10.3 224.3 0.9 
and Wood Products 
Foot wear 4.2 2.4 1,231.5 5.0 
Others 17.1 9.8 2,360.8 9.7 
. . 
Heavy Industrial 20.5 11.6 12,543.9 51.4 
Iron & Steel 
Products 
Metal Products 
Machinery 
Electronic 
Products 
Ships & Boats 
Chemical Products 0.4 
Others 4.4 
Total Exports 175.1 100.0 24,445.1 100.0 
Unit: Million U.S. Dollars 
Source: Office of Customs Administration. 
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With respect to imports by commodity, more industrial raw materials, fuel, and 
capital goods are imported than are consumer goods. Table 3-6 shows the commodity 
composition of Korean imports in 1982. Industrial raw materials and fuel comprised 
64.0% of Korea's total imports including a petroleum share of 25.2%. Consumer products 
had a share of 10.3%, including a grain share of 3.9%. In general, grain and crude oil im- 
ports are major categories for domestic use, while capital goods and other industrial raw 
. materials are imported largely to be used for export production. 
Table 3-6 
Korea's Imports by Commodity 
1982 
Amount Composition (%) 
Consumer Goods 
Food 
Durable Consumer Goods 689 2.8 
Industrial Raw Materials L 15 516 64.0 
-
and Fuel 
Petroleum 6,103 25.2 
Capital Goods 
Machinery 
Electronic and Electric 
Products 
Transportation 
Equipment 
Total Imports 24,251 
-
100.0 
-
Unit: U.S. Dollars in millions 
Source: Office of Customs Administration 
Business Structure 
Korea's industrial policy in the past 20 years has tended to favor large-scale 
enterprises and rather than small and medium-sized enterprises in Korea. This was not 
the obvious intention of the government, but the various industrial incentives, coupled with 
expansionary macro-economic policies, led to those consequences, which are not necessarily 
desirable. As a result, large-scale enterprises captured 68.4% of total output, while 
small- and medium-sized industries shared the remaining 3 1.6%. In 1982, 10,968 of 1.2% 
of 917,321 businesses in Korea were classified as large-scale enterprises while the remain- 
ing 906,353 fell into the small- and medium-sized category. 
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Thus, Korea's pattern of industrial growth depends heavily on the large-scale 
enterprises that played a leading role in industrial development of Korea. (In this respect, 
Korean experience differs much from Taiwan's where medium-sized enterprises played a 
dominant role in the industrialization.) In 1980, the export share of small- and mediurn- 
sized industries in total exports was 32.1% in Korea, while in Taiwan it was as high as 
60.4%. Note in Table 3-7 that firms exporting more than $100 million account for 45.2% 
of total exports in Korea, which is in sharp contrast to Taiwan's share of 3.5%, indicating 
that exports are produced mainly by large firms in Korea. 
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Table 3-7 
Distribution of Exporting Firms 
by Size of Export (1979) 
Korea & Taiwan 
KOREA 
Export value 
No. of Firms 
Export 
Performance 
100 and above 2 1 0.9 6,800 45.2 
50 - 100 14 0.6 942 6.3 
10 - 50 159 6.7 3,228 21.4 
5 - 10 166 7.0 1,182 7.8 
1 - 5 93 1 39.1 2,119 14.1 
1 or less 1,093 45.8 784 5.2 
TOTAL 2,384 100.0 15,055 100.0 
TAIWAN 
No. of Firms 
Export 
Performance 
-- - 
100 and above 4 - 568 3.5 
50 - 100 14 - 1,050 6.5 
10 - 50 135 0.3 4,050 25.1 
5 - 10 287 0.5 2,152 13.4 
1 - 5 2,333 4.4 5,070 31.5 
1 or less 50,027 94.7 3,212 20.0 
TOTAL 52,800 100.0 16,102 100.0 
Unit: U.S. Dollars in Millions, % 
Source: KOTRA (Korea Trade Promotion Corp.) 
To ensure balanced industrial growth and to secure a supply of more complicated 
parts and components for new technology-intensive industries, the government has been 
promoting small- and medium-sized indurjtries since the late 19709, and promotion of 
small- and medium-sized industry will be on of the most important policies under the 
revised Fifth Five-year Economic Plan (1984-1988). 
3.3 International Ties of the Korean Economy 
Overview 
Korea's outward-looking economic policy strengthened its economic ties with other 
nations. This not only helped the nation's economic development but permitted it to be 
well represented in world trade. Korea has one of the highest trade ratios in the world. 
The ratios of exports and imports to GNP reached 37.4% and 38.2%, respectively, in 1983. 
Without international transactions in commodities, labor, capital, and technology, Korea 
could not have experienced a remarkable economic growth during the past decades. 
Looking a t  Korea's trade by country, the U.S. and Japan still remain the most im- 
portant partners, followed by the European and other Asian countries (See Table 3-8). 
Japan 38.2 32.1 110.1 27.2 2.881 3,403.6 13.9 6,238.4 23.8 1.83 
Table 3-8 
Korea's Trade by Country 
1964, 1983 
Europe 15.7 13.2 39.2 
9.7 2.50 1 3,803.3 15.6 2,739.7 10.5 0.72 
1964 
Export Import Ratio 
Amt. 9% Amt. % IIE 
U.S.A. 35.6 29.9 202.1 50.0 5.67 
1983 
Export Import Rat. 
Amt. % Amt. % I/E 
8,245.4 33.7 6,274.4 24.0 0.76 
Total 119.1 100.0 404.4 100.0 3.40 124,445.1 100.0 26,192.2 100.0 1.07 
~ s i a ' ~ )  27.8 23.3 36.1 8.9 1.30 
Africa 0.3 0.3 1.3 0.3 4.33 
Others 1.4 1.2 15.6 3.9 11.14 
Unit: Million, U. S. Dollars 
Note: 
(a) Excluding Japan 
Source: Office of Customs Administration 
5,689.7 23.3 6,534.7 24.9 1.15 
768.7 3.2 620.6 2.4 0.81 
2,534.4 10.3 3,784.4 14.4 1.49 
In spite of the significant improvement of Korea's trade balance during the past two 
decades, Korea has never had any overall trade surplus in the 31 years since the Korean 
War, and i t s  trade deficit still remains substantial. Although Korea has built a surplus 
with the U.S. and European countries since the early 1980s, its trade deficit with Japan 
and other Asian countries exceeds the surplus. 
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The inflow of foreign capital to Korea between 1962 and 1983 totalled 1,704.2 mil- 
lion dollars. The advanced countries, including the US, and Japan, have played a sig- 
nificant role in supplying foreign capital needed by Korea. By 1974, some 31% of 
manufactured exports were produced by subsidiaries of foreign firms. Among the sources 
of foreign capital invested between 1962 and 1983, Japan topped the list with 49.5% of to- 
tal foreign investment, followed by the U.S. with 27.7% (See Table 3-9). A-new law, the 
Foreign Capital Inducement Act, eases foreign investment and the government approves 
foreign investments automatically in two-thirds of the 999 designated industrial sectors. 
As a result, foreign investment during the first half of 1984 jumped 319% from the year- 
earlier period, with U.S. ventures accounting for nearly half. 
Table 3-9 
Foreign Investment by Country 
1962 - 1983 
1962-1971 1972-1983 Total (1962-1983) 
Amount % Amount % Amount % 
U.S.A. 34.3 35.8 437.1 27.2' 47 1.4 27.7 
Japan 41.5 43.4 802.0 49.9 843.5 49.5 
West Germany 2.7 2.8 23.1 1.4 25.8 1.5 
Netherland 6.3 6.6 108.6 6.7 114.9 6.7 
U.K. 0.2 0.2 22.3 1.4 22.5 1.3 
Hong Kong 0.3 0.3 52.4 3.3 52.7 3.1 
Others 10.4 10.9 163.0 10.1 173.4 10.2 
Total 95.7 100.0 1,608.5 100.0 1,704.2 100.0 
Unit: Million, U. S. Dollars 
Source: Economic Planning Board 
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With regard to technical cooperation, technology imports have been encouraged with 
such government support as exemption of taxes on royalty payments. Between 1962 and 
1982 there were 2,281 cases of foreign technology imports that generated royalty pay- 
ments of more than 680.6 million dollars. Of those, 92.1% were in such manufacturing 
sectors as  machinery, electric and electronic, textiles, and chemical industries. In the past 
(1962-1982), Japan dominated as the source of technology imports, supplying 56.4% for 
Korea. The United Stated supplies only 23.4% of Korea's total technology imports (See 
Table 3-10). As. of the end of 1982, 69 foreign companies has technological ties with 
Korean automobile and auto-parts manufacturing companies. Of those, 42 (61%) were 
Japanese companies, 14 were U.K., and only 8 were U.S.. 
Table 3-10 
Technology Imports by Country 
1962 - 1982 
Country 1962-1966 1967-1977 1978-1982 Total % 
- - - - - -  
U.S. 13 196 324 533 23.4 
Japan 11 565 711 1,287 56.4 
West Germany 4 35 6 8 107 4.7 
U. K. 1 23 60 8 4 3.7 
France 1 9 5 3 63 2.7 
Other 3 59 145 207 9.1 
Total 3 3 887 1,361 2,281 100.0 
Source: Ministry of Finance 
Economic Ties between the U.S. and Korea 
Economic transactions between the U S ,  and Korea have gone through several dis- 
tinct stages during the past thirty years. From the end of World War 11 to the end of the 
1950s, the role of the U.S. in helping Korea through these difficult days showed clearly in 
their trade relationship. Korea depended on American exports to Korea, which were 
various forms of grants-in-aid, while Korean exports to the U.S. were close to nil during 
that same period. 
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In the 1960s, the role of the U.S. changed significantly. Economic aid in its pure 
form was completely phased out, while the U.S. remained one of the main suppliers of 
technology and capital. The more important role of the U.S. for Korean economic develop- 
ment in this period was as a major market for Korean exports, in particular light in- 
dustrial products. During this period, the balance of trade was still in favor of the U.S. 
In the 1970s, Korean economic development commenced to show a significant effect 
on the nation's economic strength against its trade partners. In this period, there rose a 
certain pattern of specialization in trade between the two countries. Korean exports were 
concentrated in light industrial goods, while U.S. exports tended to be polarized between 
basic materials and grains on the one hand, and high-tech and capital-intensive products 
on the other. During the period 1970-1980, a rough trade equilibrium between the two 
countries held, while U.S. exports and Korean exports increased r-pidly at an average 
growth of 23.7% and 27.8%, respectively. 
In 1982, Korea began running a trade surplus of $287 million with the U.S., and in 
1983 the surplus reached $2 billion dollars. I t  is estimated that the surplus in 1984 
reached $3 billion dollars. As a result, several categories of Korean products, including 
steel and color TV sets, have recently been restricted by U.S. barriers or voluntary restric- 
tions, while Korea has begun to liberalize its import policies. After a period of very slow 
expansion of trade between the two countries in 1979 and 1980, both imports and exports 
began to surge again in 1982, following recovery of both the U.S. and Korean economies. 
The U.S. stands as Korea's largest partner as an importer of Korean goods, and it stands 
as the second largest partner after Japan as  an exporter to Korea. 
3.4 Technology 
Overview 
Undoubtedly, Korea's comparative advantage of low labor cost has been the most 
important factor in the nation's rapid economic growth during the past two decades. 
However, that economic growth has resulted in a shortage of skilled labor and a rise in 
real wages that has exceeded productivity improvement. Further, some countries less 
developed than Korea, with much lower labor cost, have increased their relative competi- 
tiveness. Therefore, Korea cannot compete well any more solely with a labor cost ad- 
vantage in world markets characterized by rising protectionism. 
Even though Korea's economic growth is, to some extent, attributable to its improve- 
ment of productivity through improved technology, the share of its economic growth due to 
technological improvements is much less than in the U.S., Japan, and Taiwan (See Table 
3-11). 
Table 3- 1 1 
Share of Economic Growth Due to Technological 
Improvements in !he U.S., Japan, Taiwan, and Korea 
U.S.A. Japan Taiwan South Korea 
(1953-1965) . (1953-1965) (1967-1979) (1967-1979) 
Source: The Federation of Korean Industries 
In this respect, the development of technology will be an essential factor not only for 
enhancing Korea's competitiveness but for improving the nation's industrial structure. Ob- 
viously, Korea needs to improve its technology in several areas: basic technology, design 
and development, manufacturing technology, process technology, quality control, or- 
ganizational skills, etc. Korean manufacturers have had a good reputation for their 
unusual success in technology assimilation. In manufacturing technology, Korea has near- 
ly reached the world requirement. However, because Korea has depended heavily on im- 
ported technology rather than indigenous learning or technology development, basic tech- 
nology and design skills remain the weak points of Korea's technology, let alone high tech- 
nology. 
Therefore, it is clear that Korea should expand simultaneously both its imports of 
technology and its indigenous learning capability. Technology inducement, technological 
development, and manpower training deserve the most important policy priority in Korea. 
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The government has developed various kinds of support, including large-scale tax and 
financial assistance, to invigorate industrial technology development. Every year the 
government implements national technological development projects to meet the demand 
for advanced technology provide and strategically essential technology for Korean firms. 
Technology Development 
R&D investment has continuously increased due to steady gains in technological 
development through the past two decades. As late as the early 19709, total R&D invest- 
ment, including government support, showed only 10 billion won or more. It amounted to 
620 billion won in 1983 or 1.06% of GNP (See Table 3-12). However, it is still far behind 
the level of R&D investment in advanced countries (See Table 3-13). To promote economic 
growth through technological innovations, the government plans to increase R&D invest- 
ment to 2% of GNP by 1986. 
- - - - - - -- 
Table 3-12 
R&D Investment in Korea 
1970 - 1983 
R&D expenditures Ratio to GNP 
(billion won) Government:Civil (%I 
Source: Ministry of Science and Technology 
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Table 3-13 
Comparison of R&D Investment 
in Selected Countries 
1982 
Ratio to GNP Government: Civil 
U.S.A. 
Japan 
West Germany 
France 
Korea 
Source: White Paper on Science and Technology, Japan, 1983. 
Looking a t  investment by industries, the ratio on investment expenditures to sales in 
the manufacturing sector was 0.65% in 1982. This is far behind the level of the 
U.S. (3. I%), Japan (1.9%), and West Germany (3.2%). The consumer products and pri- 
mary metals sectors showed a relatively lower level, while the heavy and chemical in- 
dustry sectors such as machinery, electronics, chemicals, and transportation equipment 
showed a higher level (See Table 3-14). 
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Table 3-14 
The Ratio of R&D Investments to 
Sales by Industry in Korea 
All industries 
Manufacturing 
Foods 
Textiles 
Paper & paper products 
Chemicals 
Ceramics 
Primary metals 
General machinery 
Electric & electronic 
Precision machinery 
Transpor- 
tation equipment 
Source: Ministry of Science and Technology 
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MAJOR INDUSTRIES IN SOUTH KOREA 
Performance and Prospect 
4.1 Shipbuilding Industry 
Overview 
The shipbuilding industry in Korea, which was developed over a fairly short time 
(1973-1983), is regarded as one of the most successful in the world. According to the 
Maritime Reporter June, 1984, Korea has increased its share of the world order book 
from 2.8% in 1974 to 19% in 1983, becoming the second most important shipbuilding na- 
tion in the world, after Japan. 
Because shipbuilding is a relative11 low-energy-consuming and labor-intensive in- 
dustry, it was considered the most suitable heavy industry for Korea's resource conditions 
when the government devised the Heavy and Chemical Industry Development Plan 
launched in 1973. However, world economic conditions and the shipbuilding market during 
the early 1970s were not the most favorable circumstances for Korea to enter such a tech- 
nical and costly market with no prior experience. The super-tanker boom had already 
ended with the oil crisis of 1973, and a t  the same time protectionism continued accelerat- 
ing in world trade. Further, Korea's low level of technology and deficiency of materials, in- 
cluding steel, were disadvantages. The domestic market for new vessels was too small to 
be included as a target by industry's planners. 
Nevertheless, since 1973 many huge shipyards have been constructed in South 
Korea, the practices and skills needed for a progressive and expanding industry have been 
developed and learned in the Korean yards. Orders for new ships increased from 982,000 
tons Gross Registered Tonnage (GRT) in 1973 to 4,098 millions GRT in 1983. Exports of 
new ships, refits, and floating structures have increased a t  a growth rate of more than 
100% per year,.with value in U.S. dollars increasing from $2 million in 1973 to $3,735 
million in 1983. 
Several factors have contributed to development of the Korean shipbuilding industry: 
1) Low wages and skilled workers have enabled the Korean shipbuilders to build their 
products in less time and a t  lower cost than their competitors. 
2) The use of modern technology, resulting largely from the success of technology trans- 
fer, has also contributed to productivity. Japan has been the most important 
partner because of the geographic and cultural proximity between the two 
countries. Not only imported technologies but also the hiring of skilled and ex- 
perienced foreigners improved the industry's productivity. 
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3) Expansion of world demand for new ships in the late 1970s helped to increase orders 
to Korean shipyards. The development of controls to prevent sea pollution led 
ship owners to replace old vessels with new ones, and the expansion of world 
trade also increased demand for new ships. 
4) Preferential credit to ship exporters make Korean shipbuilders the most favored and 
largest debtors of the Korea Export and Import Bank. 
5) Contemporary development of linking industries including engine, steel, and other 
material industries stimulated the shipbuilding industry's development. Domes- 
tic production of steel has increased from 1.7 million tons in 1973 to 13.4 million 
tons in 1983. 
Shipbuilding Facilities in Korea 
Before the Hyundai Group, a leading Korean conglomerate, built the world's largest 
single shipyard a t  Ulsan between 1972-1974, Korea had only small years capable of build- 
ing s m ~ l l  ships of about 100 gross tons. Korea's annual capacity was as little as 4,600 
tons in 1962 and 250,000 tons in 1973. 
Hyundai spent $200 million to build the Ulsan yard, which has a capacity of two 
million tons. Two years later, Hyundai's closest rival, the Korea Shipbuilding and En- 
gineering Corporation, raised its annual capacity from 200,000 tons to 1.4 million tons. 
Two years after that, Daewoo and Samsung entered shipbuilding. Now Korea has four 
large shipyards and several small yards. Total capacity is about four million gross tons. 
However, this figure can be misleading as it is only nominal. It refers to the tonnage that 
could be achieved if every shipyard built the largest possible ship in each dock. The stand- 
ard known as  CGRT (Compensated Gross Registered Tonnage), which is used in Japan and 
Europe, measures Korea's capacity as slightly over two million tons. 
As the capacity of Korean shipyards increased more rapidly than production during 
the 1970s, the industry's financial condition was weakened by over-capacity. Therefore, in 
1977, to better utilize space and dock facilities, Korean shipyards began to construct float- 
ing structures and to perform refit work. As a result, exports of such categories as refit 
work and floating structures in 1983 reached $1,908 million, slightly in excess of half the 
industry's total export earning ($3,735 million), and contributed to the improvement of the 
companies' profits. 
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In 1983, total sales of the nine major companies, accounting for about 99% of total 
shipbuilding activities, registered 202 billion won (one U.S. dollar equals about 800 won), 
up about 20% from a year earlier. In particular, Daewoo realized its first profits since the 
company began shipbuilding. Sales and profits of major shipbuilding companies for 1983 
are shown in Table 4-1. 
Table 4-1 
Sales and Profits of 
Major Shipbuilding Companies 
1983 
Shipbuilding Total Sales Net Profit Exports 
Companies (million won) (million won) ~ m ~ l o ~ e e s ' ~ )  (U.S. $ thousand) 
Hyundai 992,876 
Daswoo 400,85 1 
KSEC 230,393 
Samsung 208,998 
Hyundai Mipo " 28,531 
Korea Tacoma 63,338 
Daedong 42,557 
Daesun 37,140 
Donghae 17,373 
Notes: 
(a) The number of employees who have worked more than three months as of 
the end of 1983. 
(b) Hyundai's repair yard 
Source: Korea Shipbuilders' Association. 
Problems and Prospects 
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Even though the Korean shipbuilding industry is second in the world, many 
problems still remain: 
1) Korea's advantages in cheaper labor cost and earlier delivery are opposed by the 
countervailing disadvantages of lower levels of technology and productivity than 
some competitors. 
2) Most shipbuilding-related organizations in the world agree that recovery in the world 
shipbuilding industry will come after 1987. The current recession in the world 
market is casting a shadow over the shipbuilding industry in Korea. 
3) Korean shipbuilders have been dependent largely upon imports for many of their inter- 
mediary materials, about 90% of which have been procured from Japan. This 
has the effect of conferring on Japan between 28 and 38% of Korean production. 
4) Marketing is not a strong activity within the industry. The Korean shipbuilders are 
short of overseas branches, specialized sales engineers, and information on 
potential customers and their requirements. 
Those factors lead to the conclusion that the Korean shipbuilding industry probably 
will not grow as  rapidly in future as it has in the past. However, the progressive trend in 
technical development is expected to continue, particularly in development of technically 
complex vessel construction, localization of sophisticated intermediary materials, and im- 
provements in productivity. Diversification into other products, including high-value-added 
floating structures, will be continued. Thus Korea will remain one of the most important 
shipbuilding nations, even though the Korean shipbuilding industry will not contribute to 
gowth of the nation's economy as  much as it has in the past. 
4.2 Electronics Industry 
Overview 
Korea imported all of its electronic products before 1959, when radios began to be 
assembled with imported parts for the domestic market. Thanks to expertise gained in 
radio production, the first exports of electronic products came in 1962, when U.S. $4,000 
worth of radios were shipped to Hong Kong. Thereafter, radio exports increased sharply, 
reaching U.S. $2.9 million in 1966. 
As foreign electronics firms became interested in investing in Korea because of the 
high profitability possible with industrious but inexpensive labor, the industry began to 
receive a flow of foreign capital and technology. Thanks largely to this foreign involve- 
ment, exports of electronic products quintupled from U.S. $3.6 mill 'x~ in 1966 to $19.7 
million in 1968. 
In the following year, the government introduced the Electronics Industry Promotion 
Law, explicitly recognizing the industry as a strategic export industry, and an eight-year 
development plan (1969-1976) was set in motion. As a result, production expanded a t  an 
annual growth rate of 48.6%, from U.S. $138 million in 1971 to U.S. $3,281 million in 
1979. Exports also rose sharply, a t  an average annual rate of 46.276, from U.S. $89 mil- 
lion in 1971 to U.S. $1,845 million in 1979. 
Although government support and involvement of foreign firms were major factors 
in enabling the industry to move up the technological ladder and into export markets, the 
great expansion would not have been possible without a major increase in world demand in 
the seventies. That annual growth rate was about 13%. 
When the economic environment deteriorated sharply a t  the beginning of the 
eighties, both a t  home and abroad, as a result of the oil shock and political unrest, the 
Korean electronics industry suffered. Domestic sales plummeted by about 20%, and ex- 
port growth slowed from 35.8% in 1979 to 8.6%, resulting in a production decline of 13.1% 
in 1980. Economic stability restored in 1981 allowed production to rise by 32.9% and 
5.7%, respectively, in 1981 and 1982, but this was below the record of the 1970s. The 
rise of production has been accompanied by a considerable rise in the industry's imports, 
due to its reliance on offshore sourcing four major parts and components. The fall in ex- 
ports from U.S. $2,195 million in 1981 to $2,144 million in 1982, resulted in the in- 
dustry's trade surplus decreasing from U.S. $452 million in 1981 to $165 million in 1982. 
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The Korean electronics industry still promised to grow faster than GNP during the 
next decade, however, as the world market is expected to expand a t  an average annual 
rate of 11.8% throughout the decade, and domestic demand will also be stimulated as the 
domestic society moves into a more industrialized and information-oriented era. 
The Role of Foreign Investment and Technology in the Industry 
Foreign capital and technology have contributed to South Korea's economic growth 
during the past two decades by working to develop many different kinds of industries. 
Compared to electronics, however, other industries have not been as heavily supported by 
foreign companies. Subsidiaries of foreign companies and joint-ventures have played an 
outstanding role in the industry. They provided capital and introduced technological and 
management know-how in its developing stages. Their policies have worked to enhance 
exports and employment. 
The first foreign investment was made by Fairchild Camera and Instrument of the 
U.S. in 1966. Since then, many foreign companies have become involved in the Korean 
electronics industry by way of direct investment or joint-venture. As a result, in 1970 
foreign companies and joint-ventures in Korea shared about 60% and 15%, respectively, of 
total exports of electronic products. while the share of exports attributable to foreign com- 
panies fell from 60% in 1970 to 40% in 1979, the joint-venture's share continued a t  15% 
until 1979. In 1978 the number of workers in foreign firms and joint-ventures reached 
84,546, or almost half of total employees in the industry. 
Foreign electronics firms were able to secure high profits by utilizing the country's 
abundant supply of well educated but relatively low-cost labor. The government's efforts 
to attract foreign investment and induce advanced technology also produced a flow of 
foreign capital and technology. 
As the industry has become more technology-intensive, the wages in Korea have 
begun to rise more rapidly. Foreign companies can no longer obtain the same level of 
profits as in the early stages of the industry. Therefore, the percentage share of total 
production by foreign companies and joint-ventures has decreased incrementally, while the 
volume of their production has not decreased, except for consumer products produced by 
foreign firms in 1982 (see Table 4-2). Foreign firms and joint-ventures have attached 
great weight to parts and components production, while domestic h s  have tended to con- 
centrate more on consumer products. Because the consumer products are more labor- 
intensive than other electronic products, production of consumer products by foreign firms 
is expected to be replaced steadily by domestic h s .  
- 
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Table 4-2 
Electronics Production in Korea 
by Types of Firms and Products 
1980 - 1982 
Million $ % Million $ % Million $ % 
Domes tic Firms 1,384 48.5 2,181 57.5 2,337 58.3 
Consumer Products 873 30.6 1,310 34.5 1,302 32.5 
Industrial Equipment 138 4.8 259 6.8 336 8.f; 
Parts and Components 373 13.1 611 16.2 698 17.4 
Consumer Products 69 2.4 48 1.3 76 1.9 
Industrial Equipment 197 6.9 193 5.1 237 5.9 
Parts and Components 508 17.8 605 15.9 562 14.0 
- - - - - - --- - - - -- - -- -- - - -- - - - - 
Foreign Firms 694 24.3 764 20.2 793 19.8 
Consumer Products 206 7.2 216 5.7 179 4.2 
Industrial Equipment 29 1.0 42 1.1 65 1.6 
Parts and Components 459 16.1 -507 13.4 558 13.9 
Total 2,852 100.0 3,791 100.0 4.006 100.0 
Notes: Figures may not add exactly because of rounding. 
Source: Korea Electronics Industry Association 
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The Korean electronics industry is today putting ever more stress on the develop- 
ment of technology-intensive products, and thus needs much more investment in new 
facilities and technology improvement. Therefore, there will be a niche large enough for 
foreign companies to contribute to the industry, especially by way of joint-venture and 
technology exports rather than direct investment. 
Problems and Prospects 
The electronics industry has grown remarkably during the past two decades. Al- 
though both the domestic and world economies were beset by shocks and uncertainty in the 
early 1980s, the recent environment is likely to be highly favorable to the industry. The 
industry, therefore, is expected to grow by 20 to 22% per year until 1986, and then 15 to 
17% in the following five years. However, some problems that emt +ged during the past 
period of rapid growth must be solved if the industry is to realize its full potential. . 
First, to attain more technological development, more investment in research and 
development must be made. In 1979 the industry spent the equivalent of only 1.52% of 
total sales on such investment, which is meager compared to 7.1% in the U.S. and 3.7% in 
Japan in 1976. Considering the worldwide tendency towards protectionism, and fierce 
competitiveness in advanced electronic products, the technological gap between Korea and 
other advanced countries could become a severe constraint on the industry's development 
unless appropriate measures are taken to eliminate the gap. 
Second, the industry's strong bias toward the production of consumer products needs 
to be changed. The further development of parts and components and industrial equip- 
ment production is essential to the industry's future, as the market for hi-tech products 
(such as the LSI and VLSI, computers, robots, telecommunication equipment, and office 
automation facilities) is likely to expand more rapidly than others. 
Third, rapid rises in wage costs during the seventies have underminded price com- 
petitiveness, as newly developing countries have increasingly entered the world electronics 
market with the advantages of much lower labor cost. 
Finally, to secure long-term competitiveness, Korean companies should place 
manufacturing plants in advanced nations. By doing so, Korean firms can alleviate the ef- 
fects of imports restrictions against their products, acquire advanced technology more easi- 
ly, and raise consumer confidence in the countries in which they invest. 
4.3 Machinery Industry 
Over,view 
The machinery industry, in a broad sense, includes metal products, transportation 
equipment, precision machinery, and general machinery. This section focuses largely on 
the general machinery industly, which manufactures the means of production for various 
kinds of industries. 
The general machinery industry is highly affected by the equipment investment 
plans in all industries, which in turn are influenced by business cycles. The industry has 
very high linkage effects, and it is thus of prime importance in the national economy. 
However, accumulated know-how counts for more in the machinery industry than in other 
sectors, and it is very difficult to acquire and apply such technology in a short time. As a 
result, most developing countries have had to import the bulk of their machinery from ad- 
vanced countries, which account for about 85% of world machinery exports. 
In the 1960s, the machinery industry was one of the least developed in Korea. 
Since 1973, when the government introduced the Long-term Machinery Industry Promo- 
tion Program, some remarkable advances have been made. However, Korea's rapid in- 
dustrialization had to be supported by a growing volume of machinery imports, and the in- 
dustry's trade deficit expanded during the 1970s. Even though the deficit has declined 
since 1979 because of increased exports, the industry still remains far from being self- 
sufficient. In 1983, only 46.4% of domestic demand was met by home production, and the 
remainder was met by imports. 
Improvements in the structure of the machinery industry have been made by in- 
creased investment, accumulation of technology and know-how, and the recovery of domes- 
tic and world demand. These factors also ensure that the industry will continue to play a 
very significant role in the nation's economy. 
Supply and Demand 
The Korean machinery industry has catered primarily to domestic customers, who 
have bought about 85% of total domestic production. Domestic demand for general 
machinery increased by 22.6% per year during the period of the second five-year plan 
1966-1971, reaching a value of $405 million in U.S. dollars in 1972. The rapid expansion 
continued during the 1970s, reaching $4,3 10 million in 1979, a more than ten-fold rise 
since 1971. In 1980 domestic demand fell by 36%, with a negative GNP growth of 5.2%. 
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As economic and social stability was restored in 1981, domestic demand has increased 
gradually. Estimated domestic demand in 1983 stood a t  $4,305 million, almost the same 
level as in 1979. 
In regard to export demand, only simple products, requiring a low level of technol- 
ogy, were exported in the early stages of the industry's development. In 1971 the value of 
these exports was only $12 million. From this small base, exports grew rapidly a t  a rate 
of 28.8% per year between 1973 and 1981, reaching $450 million in 1981. Notably, ex- 
ports did not decline during the world recession in the early 1980s. As a result, the 
proportion of exports to total domestic production has increased from 18.2% in 1971 to 
25.6% in 1981 (see Table 4-3). 
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Table 4-3 
Supply and Demand Trends 
in the Korean General Machinery Industry 
1966-1983 
Demand 123 417 4,607 3,529 4,092 4,159 4,966 
Domestic Demand (A) 119 405 4,310 3,171 3,642 3,689 4,305 
Exports (B) 4 12 297 358 450 470 661 
supply 123 417 4,607 3,529 4,092 4,159 4,966 
Output (C) 27 66 1,470 1,383 1,761 1,917 2,660 
Imports (D) 96 351 3,137 2,146 2,331 2,242 2,306 
Trade Deficit (D-B) 92 339 2,840 1,788 1,881 1,772 1,645 
Export Ratio (BIG) 13.7 18.2 20.2 25.9 25.6 24.5 24.8 
Import Ratio (D/A) 80.4 86.7 72.8 67.7 64.0 60.8 53.6 
Self-Sufficiency 19.6 13.3 27.2 32.3 36.0 39.2 46.4 
Ratio (C-BIA) 
Unit: U.S. Million dollars, % 
Note: 
(a) Estimated 
Source: Korea Society for Advancement of the Machinery Industry 
(KOSAMI) 
On the other hand, supplies of both imported and home-made machinery have 
reflected demand trends. Since the middle of the 1960s, as Korea's industrialization 
process began to speed up, the country's machinery production has increased rapidly to 
meet the increasing demand. However, a lack of capital, raw materials, and technology 
has hindered self-sufficiency of machinery. Therefore, a great deal of imported machinery 
has been supplied to meet domestic demands. Even though the self-sufficiency ratio of the 
industry soared from 19.6% in 1966 to 46.4% in 1983, thanks to development of domestic 
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production, the trade deficit in the industry, which reached $1,772 million in 1982, was 
equivalent to 73.9% of South Korea's total trade deficit in the same year. Nevertheless, it 
is likely that the trade deficit in the industry could swing to a surplus after the late 1980s. 
Production Facilities 
Surely, the key to improving the structure of the general machinery industry is 
development of production facilities. In the early 1970s the move to change the emphasis 
of Korea's industrial structure toward the chemical and heavy industries began, and the 
machinery industry was recognized as a key industry for the nation's economic develop- 
ment. Investment in facilities and equipment for the industry has accelerated since 1973, 
when the Changwon Machinery Industrial Complex began to be constructed. Besides the 
need to upgrade the nation's industrial structure, the policy to develop the machinery in- 
dustry was aimed a t  meeting defense needs. Between 1973 and 1978, annual investment 
in the industry expended from 6.8 billion won to 175.6 billion won. There were 1,910 
firms engaged in manufacturing general machinery a t  the end of 1981. Of these, 56 firms 
were operating with significant economies of scale, employing more than 200 people, and 
1,774 firms had less then 100 employees. 
Production facilities in the industry are fairly new. Most equipment is less than 10 
years old, because of the relatively short history of the industry. But the industry's short 
history also means thab additional technology and know-how are needed. As a result, 
there is a heavy reliance on imported technology for the production of sophisticated and 
special-process machines. Between 1962 and 1981, the industry introduced 582 new tech- 
nologies from abroad and spent U.S. $103.9 million in royalties. The industry thus ac- 
counted for nearly a third of Korea's total import of technology. The largest portion, 62%, 
came from Japan, while 17.5% came from the U.S., 6.5% from West Germany, and 4.6% 
from the U.K.. 
Besides know-how and imported technology, adequate research and development in- 
vestment is indispensable for the industry's development. Unfortunately, however, the 
Korean machinery industry invested only 0.97% of its total sales revenue in R&D, com- 
pared to more than 2% in most advanced countries and 5.6% in the US.. Small busines- 
ses in Korea can not afford massive R&D investment, and large firms with secure sales 
stemming from the narrow base of the domestic market do not have any strong incentive 
for such investment. 
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Prospects 
In general, strong investments in equipment since 1973 have left the industry with 
relatively modern facilities. If any appropriate way can be found to improve the tech- 
nological base of the industry, the Korean machinery industry will be favored to take ad- 
vantage of the world economic recovery. Further, domestic demand is likely to remain 
strong as the country continues to industrialize. This leads one to the conclusion that the 
industry will be the cornerstone of the nation's industrialization and economic development. 
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4.4 TextiIe Industry 
Overview 
From 1917, when the Chosum Spinning Company was established to meet increas- 
ing domestic demand, the Korean Textile industry continued developing a t  a slow but 
steady pace until self-sufficiency in textiles was attained in 1956. As early as 1957 the in- 
dustry began exporting surplus products. That year, exports were valued a t  $1.3 million. 
During the 1960s, the government favored labor-intensive manufacturing exports, includ- 
ing the textile industry, which retained a leading position as one of the most important 
export-oriented industries. The percentage share of textiles in Korea's total exports 
gradually increased, reaching 41.4% in 1971 with a volume of more than $400 million. 
However, changes in the 1970s exposed the industry to difficulties. A light-industry- 
oriented industrial structure began to give way to more complicated heavy and chemical 
industries, and the world textile trade became more restricted because of growing inter- 
national protectionism. 
The Korean textile industry, nevertheless, has played an important role in Korea's 
economic development, thanks to its comparative advantage of abundant low-cost but 
skilled labor. In 1982, the industry accounkd for 5.4% of the nation's total value-added 
production, 27.4% of total exports, and 5.2% of all industrial labor. On the other hand, it 
shared 5.4% of world exports and was ranked the 6th largest exporter in the world. The 
industry's position as Korea's largest single foreign exchange earner is threatened by 
problems including underinvestment, worn-out facilities, declining competitiveness and lag- 
ging technology, but its significant role in the nation's economy is likely to last for a long 
time. 
Factors Spurring Development of Korea's Textile Industry 
The textile industry was the strategic industrial arena in which developing countries 
struggled to overtake developed countries that had long been dominant. The domestic tex- 
tile industry's development was an important factor in leading Korea to its position as a 
newly industrialized nation. During the last two decades, a t  least four timely factors 
spurred development of South Korea's textile industry: 
1) The structural change of the world textile market-that is, the transfer of compara- 
tive advantages in textile production to the newly industrializing countries. 
2 )  The worldwide increase of textile goods consumption. 
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3) Simultaneous developments of the chemical industry in Korea, which enabled the 
Korean textile industry to take advantage of the worldwide surge of synthetic 
textile production. 
4) The successful transfer of technology and the comparative advantage of low-cost 
labor. 
Pertinent to the first factor is that textile production began to decline in the 
developed countries as early as 1919, while many underdeveloped countries, including 
Korea, were entering inta the factory production system. For example, the percentage 
share of expenditures absorbed by textiles, and clothing in the U.S. was reduced from 14% 
in 1919 to less than 9% in 1959. Comparative advantages in the industry moved slowly in 
favor of such developing countries as Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea. Significant 
growth of the industries in the NICs during the 1960s alarmed the developed countries and 
caused them to move to protectionism in the textiles in the early 1970s. 
The worldwide increase of textile consumption from 1955 to 1975 stimulated the 
emergence of NICs in parallels with structural changes in the world textile market. 
During the two decades world fiber consumption almost doubled, from 12.5 to 26.1 million 
tons. Per capita fiber consumption in the U.S. and European countries increased from 
14.7 kg in 1965 to 17.7 kg in 1975. The increase in textiles consumption and high pur- 
chasing power in the U.S. and European countries were of decisive importance in the 
growth of Korea's textile industry. 
One of the most important factors that gave critical momentum to development of 
the Korean textile industry was the sharp rise in use of man-made fiber, especially 
synthetic fiber and their blends. Synthetic fibers' share of the world fiber output rose from 
5% in 1960 to 29% in 1973. Because the chemical textile industry was new for both 
developed countries and the NICs, the latter were not sigmficantly disadvantaged in terms 
of technologies. The worldwide growth of chemical textiles created an advantageous oppor- 
tunity for Korea to invest in the chemical industries. Growth of synthetic fiber output in 
Korea, from 16 million square meters in 1962 to 541 million in 1976, was due largely to 
the government's policy shift into the heavy and chemical industries in the early 1970s. 
Finally, the shift in the international transfer of technology was most remarkable in 
the textile industry. The skill requirements were so modest that the developing countries 
could adjust to the latest technology embodied in the machinery, which was readily avail- 
able to manufacturers in the developing countries. Also, in such a highly labor-intensive 
industry, the relative advantage of capital intensity and technology could not offset the 
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developed countries' disadvantage of much higher labor costs, which amounted to a gap of 
as much as 600% to 700%. In 1978 the hourly wage of a blue-collar worker in Korea was 
13% of that in the US.. 
Problems and Prospects 
The Korean textile industry is confronted with many pending problems and also 
faces new challenges from such developing countries as China and other Asian and African 
countries. Therefore, various efforts should be made to solve problems, to bolster the in- 
dustry, and to allow greater maneuverability for continuous economic growth in Korea. 
Productivity bottlenecks have occurred because of use of old and worn-out equip- 
ment. The continued use of outdated equipment has caused costs to soar and product 
quality to deteriorate. Therefore, the government has encouraged investors to replace ob- 
solete equipment by supporting a 30 billion won program in 1984. Expectation of 
economic recovery will stimulate new investment in the industry. During the period 1972- 
1982 the productivity of labor increased by only 4% per year in the industry, while real 
wages increased by lo%, resulting in erosions of companies' profits and deterioration of 
international competitiveness during the same period. Diversification of types of goods and 
quality imp]-ovement will be encouraged by promoting the use bf new raw materials and 
increased investment in R&D in order to compensate for the deterioration of competitive- 
ness caused by wage increases. 
(This page i n t e n t i o n a l l y  l e f t  blank.  ) 
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4.5 Petrochemical Industry 
Overview 
The Korean petrochemical industry has grown very rapidly, even though the local 
market is relatively small and development has been hampered by the nation's lack of 
capital, technology, and the industry's basic iaw material, oil, Early on, the government 
recognized that it would be necessary to build up domestic production to meet rapidly ex- 
pending demand in accordance with Korea's industrialization, which otherwise could have 
resulted in a massive drain on the country's foreign exchange resources. Aside from im- 
port substitution, the linkage effects were also considered, because petrochemical products 
are essential raw materials for numerous industries. Consequently, petrochemicals were 
designated as  a strategic industry under the second five-year plan (1967-1972). Since 
then, the industry has expanded greatly as a result of the government's financial and ad- 
ministrative support. The industry has also played an important role as a supplier of 
basic industrial materials to such major export-oriented industries as synthetic-fiber 
fabrics, plastic fabrication, vehicles, electronic appliances, tires, and footware. During the 
period 1973-1982, domestic demand for major petrochemical products rose about four-fold, 
a t  an annual growth rate of 17%, or more than GNP growth. Two large petrochemical 
complexes in Korea, which were built in 1973 and 1979, respectively, could meet about 
80% of total domestic demand in 1980. 
Production Facilities 
Korea had two large petrochemical complexes. One, in operation since 1973, is the 
Ulsan Petrochemical Complex. It consists of a naphtha cracking ethylene plant capable of 
150,000 metric tons per year, and 20 down-stream plants. The second complex, completed 
in 1979, is the Yeocheon Petrochemical Complex, which has a naphtha cracker capable of 
producing 350,000 metric tons of ethylene per year, and 16 down-stream plants. While 
the Ulsan complex uses only naphtha as its raw material, the Yeocheon naphtha cracking 
plant can also use light oil. The plant was designed to make possible the substitution of 
gas oil for naphtha in case of a shortage of the latter. 
In regard to major synthetic resins, production facilities a t  Ulsan and Yeocheon have 
annual capacities of 595,500 tons and 420,000 tons, respectively. Capacity for synthetic 
rubber production is 100,000 tons per year a t  a styrene-butadiene plant in the Yeocheon 
complex. Synthetic fiber raw materials are produced a t  Ulsan (up to 270,000 tons annual- 
ly) and a t  Yeocheon (up to 80,000 tons annually). In addition to these, other petrochemi- 
cals and related products are produced a t  both complexes and elsewhere. 
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Until 1979 the petrochemical industry in Korea showed a relatively high ratio of 
capacity utilization, in line with increasing domestic demand and a buoyant world 
economy. The ratio decreased sharply in 1980 as overall demand declined sharply in the 
business recession following the second oil shock, while the Yeocheon complex, completed 
a t  the end of 1979, increased production capacity. The trends of capacity utilization ratios 
from 1975 to 1983 are shown in Table 4-4. 
Table 4-4 
Trends of Capacity Utilization Ratios 
in the Korean Petrochemical Industry 
1975 - 1983 
Ethylene 95 97 86 91  79 73 74 74 7 9 
Synthetic Resins 83 99 115 118 100 68 74 87 77 
Synthetic-Fiber Raw 104 119 122 115 106 99 100 97 99 
Materials 
Synthetic Rubber 97 141 116 143 121 60 67 61 5 9 
Unit: in percent (%) 
Note: 
(a) During first quarter of the year 
Source: Korea Petrochemical Industry Association. 
Problems and Prospects 
The petrochemical industry in Korea has played an important role in the nation's 
economy as a supplier of basic industrial materials, and this is expected to continue in the 
future. However, the industry faces unfavorable changes a t  home and abroad. Depressed 
domestic demand, raw material price increases, and inflows of low-priced foreign products 
are exerting tremendous pressures on the industry, while many structural problems are 
yet to be solved. Among these are: 
1) The rise of oil prices has increased costs, especially in the production of naphtha. 
Losses of competitiveness have, therefore, occurred in Korea, Japan, Taiwan, 
and European countries, where naphtha is the prime feed stock, compared to 
the natural-gas-based industries in North America. 
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2) A large price gap between domestically produced and imported petrochemicals could 
have led to a surge in imports. Therefore, the government controlled domestic 
prices to keep the gap within a set number of percentage points of import 
prices. -4s countries have dumped petrochemicals in the world market since 
1980, during the world business recession, prices have dropped rapidly. This 
caused prices of major home-made petrochemicals to be cut by between 15 and 
40% by 1982, while the cost of materials doubled. Therefore, the financial con- 
dition of the industry has deteriorated sharply. 
3) I t  may be desirable for Korea to import cheap petrochemicals rather than proceed 
with a further expansion of facilities. However, doing so would leave the 
economy more dependent on external supplies and put severe pressure on the 
balance of payments. 
In conclusion, the future of the Korean petrochemical industry depends on whether 
appropriate measures can be taken to raise its competitiveness and solve some structural 
problems. 
(Th i s  page i n t e n t i o n a l l y  l e f t  b lank . )  
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4.6 Automotive Industry 
Historical Overview 
Before Korean independence in 1945, the small domestic demand for automobiles 
and parts was met completely by imports from Japan. However, a large number of main- 
tenance and repair shops in Korea were operated mostly by major Japanese automobile 
firms such as Toyota, Nissan and Isuzu for the purpose of supplying parts for military 
vehicles in Manchuria and North China. After 1945, technicians who worked in those 
repair shops resumed the production of parts such as piston rings and pins, gaskets, 
springs, bolts and nuts, and brake linings. After 1950, automobile parts production 
proliferated rapidly, largely due to the increasing repair and replacement demand for mili- 
tary vehicles as well as for civilian motor vehicles, which were mostly rebuilt from the 
military vehicles. Thus, the replacement demand for easily made parts could be met most- 
ly by domestic production. 
During the first five-year plan (1962-1966), plants were established to assemble 
semi-knockdown vehicles imported from Japan. The first Korean small car, named 
Corona, started production in 1963 with an annual capacity of 3,430 units and a domestic 
content ratio of 20%. It was made by the Shinjin Automobile Company with capital and 
technology imports from the Toyota Company in. Japan. Kia Industrial Company, which 
was established in 1944 and made bikes until 1961, started producing three-wheel trucks 
in 1962. 
To promote competition in the automobile industry and to speed up the localization 
program, the government encouraged other companies to enter into automobile production. 
Hyundai began to assemble the "Cortina" in technical cooperation with Ford in 1968, and 
Asia started assembling the "Fiat 124" in 1970. In 1971, Kia began to produce small 
four-wheel trucks. Three of the four assemblers were owned by Koreans. One, the Shinjin 
Company, was a joint venture with General Motors of the U.S. Shinjin set up G.M. Korea 
in a joint venture with General Motors in 1972, and G.M. Korea was renamed Saehan 
when Shinjin was taken over by the Daewoo Industrial Company in 1976. When Daewoo 
took over management of the Saehan Company in 1983, it was renamed the Daewoo 
Motor Co.. 
When the first oil crisis changed the pattern of demand in 1973, the Korean govern- 
ment developed the Long-Term Automobile Industry Promotion Plan, which aimed to 
develop Korean models with 100 percent domestic content. The plan called for the produc- 
tion of so-called "citizen cars" by three designated manufacturing firms: Hyundai, Kia, and 
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Seahan. These firms were requested to produce newly designed models with more than . 
95% domestic content and with engine capacity limited to 1.5 liters. The production of 
foreign models was allowed only for medium sized passenger cars with engine capacity of 
more than 1.5 liters. 
Encouraged by the new strategy, large investments have been made in assembly 
companies to expand their capacity as well as in the parts and components industry. The 
annual assembly capacity for passenger cars reached 229,000 units by the end of 1979. 
Three new cars were developed and assembled out of mostly domestic parts and 
components-Pony by Hyundai, Brisa by Kia, and Gemini by G.M. Korea (now Daewoo). 
Among these, Pony was an original model developed by an Italian designer, while the 
others were based on old models previously produced elsewhere. The production of motor 
vehicles increased sharply after 1975, largely due to the explosive increase in domestic 
demand, which reached 204,447 units in 1979. 
Economic depression caused by the second oil crisis, however, brought a sharp 
decline in sales in both the domestic and export markets. Automobile production in 1980 
dropped to 133,084 units, only about 60% of that in 1979. After 1980 the Korean 
automotive industry suffered severe hardships and took radical actions to find a way out of 
its difficulties. On February 28, 1981, the government announced measures to restructure 
the automotive industry with a view to preventing over-competition and making as- 
semblers specialize in their major products. Car production was limited to two companies: 
Hyundai and Seahan (now Daewoo), while production of light trucks (less than 5 tons) was 
specialized and mandated for Kia. 
After 1981 the Korean economy began to rebound from the severe setback to its 
high growth track, and automobile sales in domestic and export markets increased con- 
tinuously, reaching 220,425 units of total sales in 1983. It is estimated that 1984 sales 
reached more than 250,000 units, including exports of more than 50,000. Now the 
Korean auto industry is appraised as one of the most promising by the Korean government 
and economists, and also is regarded as a would-be major producer in the world. 
Supply and Demand 
There are six assemblers of motor vehicles and about 800 firme supplying 
automobile parts and components in Korea. Despite continuous growth since 1962, the 
scale of Korean motor vehicle assemblers and parts makers is much smaller than that of 
major motor makers of industrialized countries. Annual production capacity and output of 
the six motor vehicle manufacturers between 1977 and 1983 are shown in Table 4-5. 
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During the period 1977-1979, production increases surpassed capacity increases, 
resulting in a rise in the rate of capacity utilization from 42.8% to 71.9%. However, the 
recession in 1980 reduced that rate to 35.6% in 1980 and 36.1% in 1981. A slight 
recovery in production since 1982 increased the rate to 62.4% in 1983, The production 
capacity and output of parts firms changed in a fashion similar to that of the assemblers 
(See Table 4-5). 
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Table 4-5 
Annual Production Capacity and Output 
in Korean Automotive Industry 
1977-1983 
Passenger Capacity (Unit) 130,000 216,000 238,000 204,000 204,000 204,000 
Car 
Output(Unit) 42,284 112,314 55,926 66,602 94,460 121,987 
Operation 32.5 61.6 23.5 32.6 46.3 59.8 
ratio (%) 
Truck & Capacity (Unit) 64,000 64,000 128,000 150,000 150,000 150,000 
Bus 
Output(Unit) 40,716 88,968 63,713 61,276 69,024 99,032 
Operation 63.6 139.0 49.8 42.2 46.0 66.0 
ratio (%) 
Total Capacity (Unit) 194,000 280,000 366,000 354,000 354,000 354,000 
Vehicles 
Output (Unit) 83,000 201,282 119,639 127,878 163,484 221,019 
Operation 42.8 71.9 35.6 36.1 46.2 62.4 
ratio (%) 
Parts & Capacity 130,998 336,349 461,474 562,228 487,314 554,945 
Components (million won) 
Output 83,282 212,581 198,431 270,878 298,630 396,078 
(million won) 
Operation 63.6 63.2 63.0 48.2 61.3 71.4 
ratio (%) 
Source: KIET, Field Survey, 1982, 1984. 
Korea Auto Industries Coop. Association (KAICA), 
Statistical Data, 1984. 
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With respect to vehicle ownership in Korea, mass motorization has not begun. At 
the end of 1981, there were 6.9 passenger cars and 14.8 vehicles per thousand population 
(including cars, trucks, and buses). Korea has a 2.1% and 4.4% as many vehicles per 
thousand population as the U.S. and Japan, respectively. Also, its level of automotive 
stock is low in comparison with other countries with similar levels of per capita income, 
such as Mexico, Brazil, Taiwan, and Malaysia (See Table 4-6). 
Table 4-6 
Stock of Automobiles per Thousand Persons 
in Selected Countries 
1979 
- - - - - - - - -  ---- 
Stock per 
Thousand Persons Commercial 
Country Vehicles Per capita GNP 
Total Passenger Share in U S ,  dollars 
Vehicles Cars % 
- - - - -- - - -  --- 
U.S.A. 714 556 21.9 10,943 
Japan 3 13 196 37.4 8,638 
Mexico 7 9 56 * 28.7 1,749 
Brazil 85 68 19.8 1,758 
Taiwan 2 6 18 29.2 1,866 
Malaysia 5 4 43 19.5 1,471 
South Korea 14 7 5 1.6 1,636 
Sources: 1) Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association, 
Statistics of Automobiles in Major Countries, 1981. 
2) Korea Auto Industries Cooperative Association. 
Several reasons explain the relatively low car ownership in Korea: (1) The purchase 
price of a car is very high because of taxes and public imposts (See Table 4-7 and Table 4- 
8); (2) operating costs of a car are high because of high gasoline prices and heavy taxes 
and duties on gasoline (See Table 4-9 and Table 4-10); (3) Supportive factors such as road 
and tr&c conditions, consumers' credit, used car market, etc., are not well developed; (4) 
Unfavorable geographic and demographic characteristics, including high density of popula- 
tion, limited available area, and concentration of inhabitants in big cities. 
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Table 4-7 
Tax Burden in Purchasing a Small Passenger Car 
in Selected Countries 
As of April 1981 
South ~orea') J a n  U.K. Italy U.S.A. 
PONY LANCER AUSTIN RITMO E ~ T  
1200 CC 1400 CC MORRIS 1300 CC 1600 CC 
DLX EXGL 1300 CC 65 CL 
Net Prices Before Taxes (A) 4,481 3,833 6,359 5,822 5,158 
Taxes (B) 1,990(') 773 1,561 1,267 235 
Purchase Price (C) 6,471 4,606 7,920 7,089 5,393 
(B)I(A) (%! 
Tax Burden 
(B)J(C) (%I 
Ratio of Purchase Price 3.95 0.52 0.85 1.02 0.51 
to Per capita GNP(~)  
Notes: 
(a) Per-capita GNP is based on the period average of 1980 (for South Korea, as of 
198 1). 
As of September, 1982. 
(') Excluding local authority bonds. 
Source: Hyundai Motor Company, survey, April, 1981, 
KET Yearbook of International Economics Statistics, 1982. 
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Table 4-8 
Taxes and Public Imposts 
on the PONY 1200 CC DLX 
As of September 1982 
Factory Price (A) 3,322,000 won 
Taxes and Public Imposts 
Special consumption tax (B) 
Defense tax-1 (C) 
Value added tax (D) 
Registration tax (E) 
Defense tax-2 
Acquisition tax 
License tax 
Local authority bonds 
Car tax 
Sub-total (F) 
A x 10.5% 
B x 3 0 %  
(A + B + C ) x  1 0 %  
( A + B t C + D ) x 5 %  
E x 20% 
( A + B t C + D )  x 2% 
Fixed amount 
Fixed amount 
Fixed amount 
Ratio of total taxes 
and public imposts to 
factory price (FIA) 
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Table 4-9 
Composition of Gasoline Price Per Liter 
As of August, 1982 
- - -  
Taxes 
Distri- Consu- 
Factory Special bution mer 9% 
Price (A) Consumption VAT Sub-total Fee (D) Price(E) (C/E) 
Tax (B) (c) 
Value 276.67 359.67 67.27 426.94 36.39 740 57.7 
Rates - A x 130% (A + B + D) - - - - 
x 10% 
Unit: in Won 
Source: KIET 
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Table 4-10 
Annual Operating Costs of the Passenger Car 
in Selected Countries 
As of March, 1981 
South ~orea" )  Japan Taiwan Malaysia Singapore Hong Kong 
Fuel Cost 
Gasoline price 1.02 0.77 0.75 0.44 0.45 0.50 
per liter 
Gasoline cost 2,550 1,929 1,875 1,100 1,125 1,250 
per year ( ~ 1 ' ~ )  
Taxes 
-
Car Tax 
License Tax 3 1 - 164 - - 9 
Road Tax - 90 8 4 360 110 - 
Gasoline Tax (b) - - - - 108 - 
Sub-total (B) 457 146 272 8 4 360 119 
Total Running Cost 3,007 2,072 2,147 1,184 1,485 1,369 
per Year (A + B) 
Index 100 6 9 7 1 39 4 9 4 6 
(South Korea= 100) 
Unit: in U.S. Dollars 
Notes: 
(a) Base: 100 krdday x 300 days r 12 k d  
Annual fixed amount tax. 
As of June, 1982. 
Source: Hyundai Motor Company, survey. 
Japan Daily Automobile News Co., Yearbook of Automobiles, 1982. 
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Although the use of cars by Koreans in the past has been low, it is expected that in 
the near future Korea will make great strides in motorization. Recent trends in vehicle 
registrations support this predication. Between 1980 and 1983, car and vehicle registra- 
tions increased by 50%, mostly in the private sector (See Table 4-1 1). 
Table 4-11 
Vehicle Registrations in Korea 
by Type and Use 
1980-1983 
By Use 
Year Cars Trucks Buses Total I Private Commercial 
Source: KAICA, Statistical Data, 1984. 
While the government has permitted six companies to assemble vehicles for the 
small domestic market, the limited market is dominated by three major motor companies, 
Hyundai, Daewoo, and Kia. The combined market share of the three was as high as 97% 
in 1981 (Hyundai 47.9%, Kia 31.2%, and Saehan 17.4%). As a result of the government's 
restructuring of the automotive industry in 1981, a near-monopoly by automobile type is 
inevitably allowed. In 1981, Hyundai took 72.9% of domestic passenger car sales, while 
Kia took 68.2% of domestic truck sales. 
Korean automobile exports commenced in 1975 and thereafter grew steadily with 
the appearances of the Pony, the small passenger car developed by Hyundai in 1976. 
Given that the history of Korean automobile exports is very short, the export sector grew 
substantially to play an important role for the industry. In spite of a sharp decrease in 
domestic demand in 1980, automobile exports showed a relatively low decrease, increasing 
the ratio of exports to total sales from 11.3% in 1977 to 19.9% in 1981. Notably, exports 
in 1984 showed more than 50,000 units or more than 20% of total sales, largely due to the 
success of exporting 25,000 cars to Canada. 
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The most important question that must be answered for sound growth of the Korean 
automobile industry is how the demand can be increased enough to achieve economies of 
scale. It depends on whether Koreans can achieve considerable growth in automobile ex- 
ports and find ways of boosting domestic demand for automobiles with the rise of income. 
(Refer to the book A Study of the Korean Automotive Industry, KIET, 1982). 
Domestic Content 
The assemblers of Korea began by assembling imported CKD (complete knock-down) 
parts and components. Thanks to the government policy of promoting localization of parts 
and the gradual upgrading of technology, they have succeeded in increasing the domestic 
content ratio to more than 90%. Table 4-12 shows average domestic content ratios 
weighted by production volumes between 1977 and 1981. In 1981, the average ratio of 
localization of the Korean small passenger car was the highest, 93%; that of the pickup 
was 90%; and the small-and medium-sized trucks and buses had levels of 86% and 82%, 
respectively. On the other hand, large buses and heavy trucks had respective domestic 
content levels of 72% and 66%. Foreign cars with more than 1.5 liter engine capacity had 
the lowest level of domestic content, a t  61%. The Pony's domestic content reached more 
t.han 96% in 1984. 
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Table 4-12 
Domestic Content Ratios by Vehicle Type 
1977 - 1981 
Unit: Percent 
1977 1979 1981 change 
1977-1981 
Passenger K o r e a n ~ o d e l s ' ~ )  89.8 90.5 92.8 3.0 
Cars 
Foreign Models " 60.4 60.0 61.3 0.9 
Buses Small & 81.2 86.6 86.4 5.2 
Medium 
Sized 
Large-Sized (') 70.9 69.7 72.4 1.5 
Trucks Pickups 86.2 89.2 89.9 3.7 
Below 73.3 76.9 82.3 9.0 
8 Tons 
Over 60.3 62.4 65.9 5.6 
8 Tons 
Notes: 
(a) Korean model passenger cars include Brisa, Brisa 11, Gemini, Pony, etc. 
') Foreign model passenger cars include Fiat, Peugeot, Rekord, Cortina, 
Granada, etc. 
Large-sized buses include rear-engine buses and highway buses. 
Source: KIET, op. cit. 
Factors responsible for Korea's failure to achieve 100% localization vary, depending 
on vehicle types and models. Small passenger cars are produced in relatively large quan- 
, 
tities, but technical problems prevent auto makers from attaining 100% localization. The 
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reason for the unsatisfactory progress in the foreign models is not only that their produc- 
tion quantity is very low but that the Korean replacement models have not yet been 
developed. In 1983, when Hyundai's Cortina was replaced 'by Stellar, which was 
developed as a Korean model, the local content ratio of that car increased from 62% to 
90%. Without such replacement of other models, complete localization of these cars would 
be very difficult. Buses and large trucks are produced in such small quantities that com- 
plete import. substitutions are for the moinent not economical, because full localization 
without economies of scale would probably lead to an increase in production cost. Com- 
plete localization depends not only on technology level and scale economies but on the 
localization efforts of both assemblers and parts makers. 
Assembler-Supplier Relations 
In general, interactions between automobile assemblers and parts suppliers in Korea 
are much greater in terms of product flows than in the U.S. and Japan. While parts 
representing about 45% and 25% of a car's purchased value are made inhouse for U.S. 
and Japanese manufacturers, respectively, only 12.6% were made in-house for the Korean 
counter parts in 1981. Moreover, the percentage share made in-house for truck and bus 
manufacturing in Korea was, on the average, as low as 8.0% and 3.7%, respectively. Con- 
sidering about 20% offshore sourcing of auto parts and components, approximately 70% of 
parts and components used by Korean manufacturers are subcontracted out to domestic 
parts suppliers. 
Despite such a close relationship in terms of parts purchasing between assemblers 
and parts suppliers, the subcontracting system is not well developed or conducive to 
development of suppliers in Korea. The links between assemblers and suppliers are very 
weak in terms of equity share and human-technology flow. Fewer than 10 out of about 
800 parts suppliers have equity-holding relationships with assemblers in Korea, and 
Korean automakers have relied largely on direct market forces among suppliers. 
The Japanese automotive-supplier industry is vertically organized in terms of equity 
share and human technology flows, with a hierarchical, multi-tier structure. In contrast to 
the Japanese system, Korean subcontracting is more competitive and horizontal. Accord- 
ing to a survey conducted by the Korea Auto Industries Cooperative Association, total 
sales of parts and components by 773 suppliers to Korean automobile manufacturers 
reached 510.2 billion won (U.S. $681.3 million) in 1982. A KIET survey based on a 
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sample of 99 suppliers showed that 93 out of 99 parts makers were first-tier suppliers to 
OEMs. The remaining six serviced only the aftermarket, without any product flows to 
OEMs. In contrast to Japan, there are no second-tier suppliers in Korea. 
One reason for the horizontal structure of the Korean automotive-supplier industry 
is that parts makers in Korea had grown independently, catering to the repair and replace- 
ment market, before vehicle assembling started. Therefore, there were initially no close 
ties with automobile assemblers. Another reason may be the lack of capital and limited 
technological capacity of assemblers. Because of the small scale of vehicle production, as- 
semblers have not been very interested in keeping close ties with parts makers, so that 
parts and components have been provided on a short-term competitive basis rather than a 
long-term contractual basis. 
Conditions and terms related to subcontracting, however, are changing significantly. 
As the scale of automobile production has increased and is expected to grow rapidly, 
automobile manufacturers realize that the supplier relationship is critical to competitive 
success in product cost and quality. Most automobile makers, including three major com- 
panies, Hyundai, Daewoo, and Kia, are establishing their own cooperative system by 
reducing their sourcing partners to one or two suppliers for each part and component 'and 
increasing financial and technical support for those selected suppliers. The relations are 
becoming more substantial according to proactive efforts by automakers. Many companies 
have adopted the Japanese-style just-in-time inventory method, stable contracts, earlier 
product and process involvement, and a target-cost system. 
On the other hand, government has undertake a series of measures to improve the 
subcontracting system as an effective means of promoting the parts and component in- 
dustry. The Small and Medium Industry Systemization Promotion Law provides that 
some items designated by government should be subcontracted out to parts makers and 
not made in-house. Technical cooperation and joint investment in R&D is encouraged and 
supported by the government. In addition, payment conditions, contract terms, and other 
subcontract practices are supervised by the government in favor of parts makers. Thus 
Korean companies will likely develop more cooperative relations in terms of product flows 
and human-technology flows in the future. 
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Prospect 
The Korean automotive industry underwent a very trying period during the deep 
recession between 1979 and 1981, and is now gearing up to become a major automotive 
power and significant exporter. However, the future of the Korean automobile industry is 
in dispute. For instance, Mr. Gerhard Pohl, an economist of the World Bank, is one of 
those who are optimistic about the Korean automobile industry. His opinion is grounded 
on these reasons: (1) excellence in technology assimilation; (2) the huge size of Korean con- 
glomerates; (3) the low wage rate; and (4) a continued rapid growth of incomes. In con- 
trast, other analysts point out negative factors, such as (1) domestic political issues; (2) a 
debt crisis; (3) increased worldwide protectionism; (4) a small domestic market; and (5) low 
quality and outdated technology. (For a more detailed appraisal of issues, refer to 
X E T ,  A Study of the Korean Automotive Industry, December, 1982.) 
Putting positive and negative factors together, the Korean automobile industry will 
unquestionably play the locomotive role in Korea's economic growth in the late 1980s and 
following decade. Based on increasing domestic demand, the Korean automotive industry 
will achieve international competitiveness and hence will be able to export vehicles on a 
fairly large scale. Japan, dominating the world automobile exports currently, is taking 
steps to reorganize its industrial structure towards more knowledge-intensive industries. 
It is expected that the automobile industry will be transferred partly to newly industrializ- 
ing countries like Korea, based on the product life cycle theory. How well will Korea suc- 
ceed in the automotive industry? Time will tell. 
APPENDIX : Q&A on  Investment in  Korean Automotive Industry 
Part 1 : Basic policy and relevant laws on foreign investment 
Q : What is the government's basic policy on foreign investment? 
A : The government has pursued an  "open door" policy for foreign investment and other 
external liberalization (See Section 3, 3.1 Economic Polic~). 
Q : What are the relevant laws and regulations governing foreign investment in Korea? 
A : The primary regulations concerning foreign investment are contained in the FCIA 
(Foreign Capital Inducement Act, newly revised on July 1, 1984), which regulates 
foreign equality investment, foreign loans, and technology inducement. The FCIA 
further stipulates conditions and procedures for licensing, tax incentives, and 
repatriation of capital as well as remittance of dividends. Other laws relating to 
foreign investment are the Foreign Exchange Control Law, the Customs Law, the 
Commercial Code, the Alien Land Acquisition Law, and various tax laws. 
Q : What are the main differences between the revised FCIA and the previous act? 
A : Under the revised act, the Negative List System replaces the Positive List System, 
and an automatic approval system is adopted. 
Q : What is the Negative List System? 
A : Industrial categories previously open to foreign investment were listed on the Positive 
List. The Negative List, on the contrary, outlines only the areas prohibited to and 
restricted for foreign investors. Accordingly, the areas not appearing on the Nega- 
tive List can be freely invested in. 
Q : What is the Automatic Approval System? 
A : An applicant for foreign investment can freely invest simply by reporting to the Min- 
ister of Finance if all of the following conditions are met: 
1) The foreign investment ratio is less than 50%; 
2) The project concerned is not in an area on the Negative List; 
3) The amount of foreign investment is equivalent to U.S. $1 million or less; 
4) A foreign investor does not apply for tax exemption or reduction. 
Q : What types of projects are not freely eligible for foreign investment? 
A : Industrial areas in which foreign investment is prohibited or restricted are enumerated 
on the Negative List. Prohibited Projects means projects in which foreign invest- 
Appendix 
ment is not allowed a t  all, including public projects to be carried out by the nation or 
public organizations. Restricted projects means projects in which foreign investment 
is restricted as yet but shall be gradually allowed after certain developments in the 
national economic situation, including -highly pollution-prone projeits. In cases 
where an application is made for approval of a foreign investment which is listed. 
under Restricted Projects, the Minister of Finance (MOF) may review and approve 
the investment after consultation with the minister concerned. The relevant min- 
ister may set certain criteria in order to make foreign investments in 
~est r ic ted Projects possible. MOF may approve the investments according to such 
criteria (See Part 2 for the criteria related to the automotive industry). Other areas 
not listed as prohibited and restricted can be freely invested in. 
Q : Are there any restrictions on the foreign investment ratio? 
A : No. The foreign investment ratio is, in principle, determined according to the agree- 
ment between a foreign investor and his Korean partner. (Note, however, that if 
the ratios exceed 50%, permission must be obtained from the MOF.) 
Q : What projects are eligible for tax exemption or tax reduction? 
A : A tax exemption or tax reduction can be given to any of the following types of projects 
possessing foreign investment: 
1) Projects which make a significant contribution to improvement of the inter- 
national balance of payments; 
2) Projects which make use of advanced technology or involve a large amount of 
capital; 
3) Projects which are located in a free export zone in accordance with the Free Ex- 
port Zone Establishment Law; 
4) Any other project designated by the Enforcement Decree of FCIA as a project for 
which tax reduction or exemption is essential in order to induce foreign 
investment. 
Q : Is retention of a Korean lawyer or proxy necessary? 
A : There is no legal requirement for foreign investment applicants to obtain the assistance 
of a Korean lawyer or proxy. It is up to foreign investors. 
Part 2 : Criteria for permitting foreign investment in the Korean automotive industry 
Q : Are projects related to the manufacture of motor vehicles, parts, and components 
eligible for foreign investment? 
A : Manufacture of motor vehicles is listed in prohibited projects, excepting a joint venture 
with an existing Korean company. Basically, projects related to auto-parts 
manufacturing fall under restricted projects. However, manufacture of the following 
parts is not restricted and can be freely invested in: trans-axles, auto transmission 
gears, CV joints, universal joints, gasoline carburetors, crank shafts, emission con- 
trol systems, distributors for engines, steering gear boxes, brake boosters, and steer- 
ing pumps. In addition, even items listed in restricted projects may be eligible for in- 
vestment after being reviewed by the Ministry of Trade and Industry. 
Q : What are the criteria for permitting foreign investment in those restricted automobile 
items? 
A : Manufacture of items listed under restricted projects may be eligible for investment if 
the activity does not violate these laws: the Small and Medium Industry Systemiza- 
tion Promotion Law and the Machinery Industry promotion Law. 
Q : What conditions related to foreign investment are imposed by the Small and Medium 
Industry Systemization Promotion Law? 
A : The law permits joint ventures with existing Korean companies that manufacture 
products designated as systemization items by the government. If a use of proposed 
raw materials and introduction of a new production process do not fit in with the 
facilities of an existing Korean company, then a new company may be formed by 
foreign investors. 
Q : What restrictive conditions are imposed by the machinery Industry Promotion Law? 
A : According to Article 6 of the law, production of engines, transmissions, and axles in 
Korea is subject to completion of a prior feasibility review. Therefore, even Korean 
companies should complete a prior feasibility review for manufacturing of those 
items. Foreign applicants who plan to invest in production of those items in Korea 
should have a prior feasibility review completed by the Ministry of Trade and In- 
dustry. 
Q : Are there any conditions on the joint venture with an existing Korean company for 
manufacturing motor vehicles? 
A : According to Article 6 of the Machinery Industry Promotion Law, manufacturing of 
complete vehicles is also subject to completion of a prior feasibility review. 
Therefore, as in the case of major parts, foreign applicants and their Korean partner 
should have a prior feasibility review completed by the Ministry of Trade and In- 
dustry. (The Sarnsung project with Chrysler to build small cars in Korea is a good 
example.) 
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Part 3 : Further information and advice 
Q : What are the procedures for approving foreign investment? 
A : An applicant for foreign investment must submit to the Ministry of Finance an  applica- 
tion in accordance with the FCIA together with related papers. Further information 
on conditions and procedures for approving foreign investment may be found in the 
Foreign Capital Inducement Act, Enforcement Decree, and Working Rules (Refer to 
Ministry of Finance, Foreign Capital Inducement Act, Enforcement Decree, 
and Working Rules, 1984, written in English). 
Q : Where can an applicant obtain further information and advice on investment? 
A : The Foreign Investment Promotion Division of the Ministry of Finance (MOF) proces- 
ses foreign equity investment proposals and all the procedures for investment ap- 
proval. However, foreign equity investment in a free export zone in Masan or Iri 
comes under the supervision of each zone office. Overseas, several investment 
promotion officers have been assigned by the MOF to render investment information 
services in foreign countries. They are stationed in New York and Washington D.C. 
in the United States. Furthermore, the MOF has initiated establishment of an "In- 
vestment Guide to Korea Information Desk" a t  overseas branches of Korean bank- 
ing institutions and other representative offices of private agencies such as  Korea 
Trade Centers. 
Q : How can an appropriate Korean partner be found? 
A : The Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Federation of Korean Industries, 
the Korean Trader's Association, the Korea Productivity Center, the Korep. Develop- 
ment Bank, banking institutions, or other industry associations (such as the Korea 
Auto Industries Cooperative Association) can provide lists of Korean businessmen 
seeking foreign partners and other information on those Korean partners. 
Note : Refer to following materials: 
(1) Ministry of Finance, Republic of Korea, Investment Guide to Korea, 1984. 
(2) MOF, Questions and Answers for your investment in Korea, 1984. 
(3) MOF, Foreign Capital Inducement Act, Enforce- 
ment Decree, and Working Rules,1984, 
(4) MOF, Guidelines for Foreign Investment; Negative List Attached, July 2, 1984. 

